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Across the world, the regional level is becoming increasingly important in economic development with a
proliferation of regionally-based initiatives. This has important consequences for how institutional capacity is
able to take and influence decisions with regard to the long-term future development of particular localities: in
short the patterns of regional governance. Two aspects are central to this: (i) the question of governance - how
does the ongoing process of institution-building affect the ways in which the regions and localities are governed,
including questions of democracy, participation, regional self-determination, public-private partnerships and
accountability; and (ii) what are the consequences of new modes of governance and institutional change for
regional development strategies and policies, particularly in the context of large-scale industrial restructuring
and city-region and urban regeneration.
To address these issues, we draw upon a number of disciplines and link critically to several of the other
themes in the overall set. We explore questions related to the relationship between governance, institutional
change and regional development:
• on a micro-level the relationship between individual economic actors, development bodies and their
environment is examined. This considers both the concepts underpinning industrial districts and
networking between private and public economic players, and also the links between agencies under the
heading of “Partnership and regional development”. Building strong relationships with private sector
firms and organizations has been seen as a priority for public and semi-public development agencies, and
the experience in North America and in the European regions, both the difficulties and the successes, is
covered and subjected to critical and theoretically informed analysis
• on a meso-level the role of government bodies, various forms of development agencies, both within
government structures and beyond, in the political make-up of their region is examined under the
heading “Networking and regional governance”. The increasing reliance on individual agencies or
networks of development bodies raises important questions about the relationship between functional
efficiency and democratic legitimacy, not least when the European dimension in the form of Structural
Funds programmes is involved
• on a macro-level the relationship between regionally-based initiatives, federal levels of governance and
the emerging European system of governance in Western Europe is discussed under the heading of
“Regional Development and Multi-level Governance”. The last few decades have seen a decreasing
role for the traditional regional subsidy programmes of central government and a veritable explosion
of bottom-up development bodies and initiatives, and through federal or European Union Structural
Funds these two levels have been linked together in an intricate pattern spanning across continents
e.g. the USA and Europe. In the search for knowledge about the new developments on the regional
and continent levels, the transformed role of central government has been somewhat overlooked and
therefore considering the relationship between the national, regional and European levels of governance
is very much a worthwhile task.
Much of the material is drawn from European examples, and particularly from Scotland. Of all the areas
of Europe, Scotland looks most readily to North America for policy initiatives, with many being adopted
subsequently based on this experience across the continent. With the re-establishment of the Scottish





Many areas of the industrialized world, and especially in Europe, are currently experiencing two parallel
developments: the increasing political importance of the regional level and the proliferation of regionally-
based initiatives in economic promotion. Both have important consequences for the distribution of the
institutionalized capacity to make and influence decisions regarding the long-term future and development of
a particular locality. in short these developments will affect the patterns of regional governance.
These developments can be placed in the context of the wider interests in regional governance and institutions
which came to the fore in the 1980s in both the literature of economics and geography, when attention began
to be given to such factors as institutional capacity, thickness, the invisible factors in regional development,
networking and industrial districts .. This set of learning materials represents a timely and critical reflection
on the prominent role of governance, institutions, institution-building and institutional change in regional
development at the start of the new millennium. Although institutions, networks and partnerships rather
than policies often seem to be the answer to regional problems, they have also been stimulated by the general
acknowledgment across the social and regional sciences of the importance of governance ..
Two issues are central to this set of learning materials:
• The question of governance - how does the ongoing process of institution-building affect the ways in
which the regions and localities are governed? This question encompasses questions of democracy,
participation, regional self-determination, public-private partnerships and accountability
• The consequences of new modes of governance and institutional change for regional development
strategies and policies, particularly in the context of large-scale industrial restructuring and city-region
and urban regeneration
1.2 Developing Regional Governance and Institutional Capacity
In addressing the emerging issues of regional governance and institutional capacity this section draws upon
material in a number of disciplines and links critically to a number of the other themes in the overall set. It
is based on current research as well as the existing literature and a number of networks concerned with the
analysis of institutions, governance and regional development.
The new institutional environment is characterized by agencies dedicated to the promotion of the regional
development of their areas. A recent book (Halkier, Danson and Damborg 1998) found that institutions such
as regional development agencies (RDAs) are beginning to evolve into organizations which do not aim to
deliver economic development services directly as much as they try to coordinate the delivery. By acting as
catalysts, these agencies have moved beyond simple bodies engaged in development themselves by working in
partnership with other players in the regional economy.
Much analysis has been done of these agencies and that of federal, national and regional partnerships within
different environments in Europe and the United States. These analyses have focused on their policies,
programs and performances, utilizing traditional economic evaluation techniques. But these analyses reflect
the traditional form of RDAs. The evolution of RDAs into new forms of development institutions suggests that
new theoretical approaches and assessments are needed to analyze them. These institutions are significant in
the delivery of regional economic strategies across the developed world, with RDAs having been established in
most developed countries and regions. But there is a clear need to consider their position within the overall
structures of regional governance.
The trend towards decentralization, albeit uneven across continents, is often primarily analyzed from the
perspective of an increase in democracy, often with the national level being seen as an inherently centralizing
force only reluctantly giving way to the rising tide of regionalism, with its demands for enhanced levels of
self-determination. While this is an important part of the story, there is also another side to the trend toward
decentralization, that of the federal or central government relieving itself of responsibility for policy areas that
have become a liability. This can arise either because the federal or central government lacks the resources to
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manage them effectively, because the economic burden can be off-loaded by passing them onto lower tiers of
government, or because the political burden of being responsible for unsuccessful policies is deemed to be
high.
1.3 Structure of this Set of Learning Materials
This set of materials discusses questions related to the relationship between governance, institutional change
and regional development under a number of main headings:
• SECTION 2: This section considers the theoretical bases for the study of regional governance, institutions
and regional development. It follows with an exploration of the origins of much of this study in the
work of Alfred Marshall in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Focusing on Marshall’s
analysis of industrial districts, the section argue that certain aspects of Marshall have been ignored in
standard texts. In particular the section contends that Marshall can be seen in a different light than as
the neo-classical “father of economics”
• SECTION 3: This section extends the theoretical bases to look at some of the approaches to analyzing
regional governance and development. It discusses the application of economic and organizational
theories to the study of different forms of strategy, introduces the concept of the RDA, and discusses
the links between partnerships and networks
• SECTION 4: The strategic approach to dealing with the regional economic problem has increasingly
become dependent on the RDA. This section explores the nature and rationale for such an institutional
form of intervention in the market economy at the level of the region. How such agencies perform under
different forms of regional governance is examined against a set of guiding principles
• SECTION 5: We explore the relationship between individual economic actors, development bodies and
their environment on a micro-level. The section considers both the concepts underpinning industrial
districts and the mechanics of networking among private and public economic players. Building strong
relationships with private sector firms and organizations has been seen as a priority for public and
semi-public development agencies; this section reviews the experience that North America and the
European regions have had in building such relationships
• SECTION 6: On a meso-level we examine the role of government bodies and various forms of development
agencies (both within government structures and beyond) in the political make-up of their regions. The
increasing reliance on individual agencies or networks of development bodies raises important questions
about the relationship between functional efficiency and democratic legitimacy
• SECTION 7: On a macro-level the relationship between regionally-based initiatives, federal levels of
governance and the emerging European system of governance in western Europe is discussed under
the heading of “Regional Development and Multilevel Governance”. The last few decades have seen a
decreasing role for the traditional regional subsidy programs of central government and an explosion
of bottom-up development bodies and initiatives. Through federal or European Union Structural
Funds these two levels have been linked together in an intricate pattern involving nations on different
continents, such as the United States and Europe. In the search for knowledge about new developments
on the regional and continent levels, the transformed role of central government has been overlooked
• SECTION 8: The final two parts of the section use case study materials to examine the arguments around





2.1 Regional Development and Innovation
Ever since the establishment of industrial society, economies have been faced with the problem of industrial
renewal. Economists have attempted to deal with this problem amid increased competition and changes
in consumer demand. Renewal can refer to innovation and development within established industries, the
attraction of new industries through such measures as direct foreign investment, the formation of new
indigenous firms, or a combination of all three strategies. The success of a particular strategy is usually
measured by the economic indicators of low unemployment and high levels of gross domestic product (GDP).
Given the fact that this set of materials discusses industrial production within specific locations, there is an
obvious spatial element that we need to address in our measuring of the success of various strategies.
While the problem of industrial renewal can be traced back to the establishment of industrialization1 the scale
and pace of renewal has grown over the last two decades in what can be described as “mature” economies.
The need for industrial renewal is tied specifically to the decline of traditional manufacturing and extraction
industries within these “mature” economies.2 This section will deal with problems associated with industrial
renewal within mature economies over the last two decades, focusing on governance structures, namely
industrial districts, networks and partnerships.
The changing nature of innovation within industrial production can be cited as the principal cause of the
accelerated need for policies to tackle the problems associated with industrial renewal. This changing
nature has affected “mature” economies in two ways. First, the “Fordist” techniques of production and
“Taylorist” methods of scientific management have been replaced with new production methods such as
flexible specialization.3 This has led to firms and industries which have not adapted to these new methods
of production becoming uncompetitive. Not all industries and firms are developing on the lines of flexible
specialization or variants of flexible specialization such as just-in-time. However, firms in the more dynamic
sectors of the economy are developing on these lines. Second, the increasing internationalization of business
organization has led to the growth of mass production methods in low-cost countries or low-cost regions.
Typically, the mass production low-cost firms that locate their branch plants in “mature” economies are
attracted, through incentives, to regions that have suffered from industrial decline of traditional manufacturing
and extraction industries.
The development of new methods of production such as flexible specialization has coincided with a growth in
the small medium enterprise (SME) sector in the “mature” economies. According to Stanworth and Gray
(1991) between 1979 and 1986 the total number of business enterprises rose from 1.791 million to 2.471 million
in the United Kingdom. “Of the 1986 total number of enterprises, only 12,000 had 200 or more employees
and only 4,000 had 500 or more. The share of enterprises with fewer than 500 employees increased from 57.3
to 71.3 per cent of total private sector employment between 1979 and 1986” (Stanworth and Gray, 1991, 6).
This growth in importance of the SME sector can be attributed to a number of factors such as a reaction to a
downturn in the economy, with people whose jobs have been made redundant turning to self-employment as a
means of earning a living. According to Pyke and Sengenberger (1992, 9) “A surge of small businesses, and a
loss of employment in large firms, occurred during the Great Depression in the 1930s. It recurred in the 1970s
and 1980s following the recession after the oil shocks. Yet, when the national economies expanded again
more strongly during the 1980s, the trend to small firm employment continued, suggesting that small firm
expansion is more than a transitory, cyclical phenomenon.” Pyke and Sengenberger are unconvinced by the
usual arguments cited for the growth in the SME sector, such as sectoral shift, avoiding “red tape” and cost
reductions. They argue that the growth in SMEs has occurred across sectors and ask why the avoidance of
red tape and cost reductions has only become important in the last two decades. According to their argument
the main reason for the growth of SMEs in “mature” economies is changes in the organization of production.
1In the case of the UK economy Hobsbawn identifies the beginnings of decline of industry “between the middle of the century
and the 1890s” (Hobsbawn 1968).
2Principally, the economies of Western Europe, the United States and Japan
3See for example the 1988 UK White Paper on Competitiveness
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TABLE 2.1 Percentage of employment in enterprises with fewer than
100 employees, European Union countries (early 1980s)
Manufacturing Services Whole economy
United Kingdom 22.0 NA NA
Italy 58.9 NA NA
Germany NA NA NA
France 44.1 72.1 55.1
Netherlands 37.8 65.0 57.5
Belgium 32.8 55.7 45.9
Spain 43.4 59.7 58.6
Greece NA NA 68.7
Portugal 43.8 78.8 57.6
Luxembourg 19.2 NA NA
Denmark 39.8 NA NA
Republic of Ireland 38.1 NA NA
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1987a)
This material analyses the impact of these new types of methods of organizing production, namely industrial
districts, networks and partnerships. Although SMEs are not the only units of production within these new
methods of production, recent policy initiatives in mature economies have placed an increased emphasis on
SMEs that reflects their growing importance. Industrial districts, networks and partnerships are regarded as
new methods of production, but it has to be remembered that some of these methods of production have
a long history. Industrial districts were noted by Marshall in Principles of Economics in 1890. They have
recently been “rediscovered” in many regions of mature economies. Industrial districts can now be analyzed
as “new” types of industrial productive systems, because they transcend the neo-classical notion of the firm.
One finds an increased awareness being placed on institutional capacity, governance and institutional change
in regional development. Within the existing literature Becattini (1990, 38) provides a useful definition
of industrial districts... “a socio-territorial entity which is characterized by the active presence of both
a community of people and a population of firms in one naturally and historically bounded area. In the
district, unlike in other environments, such as manufacturing towns, community and firms tend to merge.
The fact that the dominant activity is an industrial one differentiates the industrial district from a generic
‘economic region’.” Becattini argues that the surplus generated from production within a district necessitates
the development of trade which “excludes the possibility of accidental placing of the products of the district
on the external market, and requires instead the development of a permanent network of links between
the district and its suppliers and clients” (Becattini 1990, 38).4 What Becattini clearly identifies is the
importance of socio-political factors, the links between suppliers and clients, and the impact of the community
in enhancing the performance of firms within industrial districts. In essence the governance structure of the
type of productive system is of crucial importance. The importance of the governance structure necessities
an economic analysis that transcends the strict neo-classical economic approach for the identification of the
economic gains accruing to businesses organized in specific types of organizational structures.
Within the existing literature three broad approaches have been adopted to analyze these “new” forms of
industrial productive systems. First, there is the transactions costs approach, a neo-classical framework
developed by Williamson through Coase. The second approach focuses on “embeddedness.” The “embed-
dedness” school is critical of the neo-classicists, believing that they fail to capture the essential dynamism
of the districts. Harrison (1992) introduces the idea succinctly: “Whatever their purported stability, the
‘historical and cultural vestiges’ that contribute to the ‘localized “thickening”’ invite references to another
whole intellectual stream that has fed the writing on the industrial districts. This is the idea of ‘embedded-
ness’, and it is quite different from the modes of theorizing to be found in conventional regional economics
4A discussion of this White Paper is found in section 8 of these learning materials. Reference to institutional/evolutionary
approaches to regional governance structures can be found in section 3.
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- or to any other branch of standard (neoclassical) economic theory, for that matter.” The third broad
approach begins from an empirical policy perspective and typically involves the citation of case studies and
identification of key characteristics of production organized through differing governance structures. From
there it proceeds backwards to establish some insights into a theoretical perspective whereby policy initiatives
could be forthcoming. This third approach relegates any economic analysis to a minor role, citing the political
and social aspects of the individual case studies. These three approaches are broadly defined, and many
researchers would argue that they represent “false” boundaries.
These three broad approaches to analyzing new productive systems further reflect the importance of the
concept to academics and policymakers from a wide variety of backgrounds.
• The spatial aspect and emphasis on agglomeration economies has attracted interest from regional
economist.
• The development of trust and cooperative relations evident in many of the industrial districts has
caught the attention of political scientists
• The specific nature of the industrial process has similarly been analyzed by researchers and commentators
involved in the debates over flexible specialization and post-Fordism
• The apparent “success” of the regions containing and developing industrial districts has, for obvious
reasons, attracted the attention from policymakers from the European Union down
All three of these approaches to understanding new types of productive systems owe a debt to Marshall.
From this common starting point, however, the three approaches quickly diverge, stressing different aspects of
Marshall. The “neo-classical” approach stresses the acceptable face of Marshall found in his static equilibrium
analysis in Principles of Economics. The standard critical appraisal of Marshall, too, employs a selective
reading of Marshall. Harrison, for example, neglects recent developments within the discipline of economics
that may lend themselves to better analysis of new productive systems, most pertinently game theory and
evolutionary economics. Harrison is correct to identify the problems of a neo-classical approach along the lines
of traditional analysis of industrial economics, following Coase, Williamson et al. Their approach, however,
risks “throwing the baby out with the bathwater” by ignoring important sections of Marshall, as does much
of the existing literature. Researchers using the empirical policy approach emphasizes the socio-economic side
of Marshall’s work. Because of this, they often fail to identify the role of custom, habit and the achievement
of cooperation and trust within industrial districts as outlined by Marshall. Though their work stresses these
points as being crucial to the success of current industrial districts, it generally fails to identify them in
the original Marshallian analysis. This is somewhat surprising, given the credit that much of the literature
gives to Marshall for outlining these points. Shove, for example, states that Marshall “recognized more fully
than Mill and much more fully than Ricardo the influence of social customs and institutions on economic
behaviour; and he tried to weave it into the fabric of his system.” (1942, 308). A reading of Marshall can
identify him as an institutionalist/evolutionary economist; recent developments within regional economics
are better understood from this perspective. Understanding the gains from organizing production within
spatially specific regions either through a partnership, network or industrial district structure requires an
institutional/evolutionary economic approach.
The idea of encouraging cooperation between firms as a policy instrument is not new; it has underpinned
Japanese industrial policy for the last four decades. Within the European Union, the earliest formulations of
an industrial policy, for example the ESPRIT program, made cooperation between firms a major objective.
However, the difference between these types of cooperative ventures and what is being discussed in these
learning materials is the spatial aspect of promoting industrial development within specific regions. Elements
of a strategy leading to the promotion of a more spatially specific industrial policy is observable within the
European Union’s White Paper Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (CEC 1994) “The proliferation within
the Community of ‘clusters’ that combine industrial, technological and geographical advantages may hold
one of the keys to job creation. This requires the active involvement of all the actors concerned, something
which can be greatly facilitated by structural measures taken at Community and national level” (79). This
promotion of “clusters” is only one of several measures identified by the European Union. By promoting
this type of policy the European Union is falling into line with many member states in two ways; first, by
recognizing that SMEs are the potential main source of new employment, and, second, by recognizing that
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one way to encourage SMEs to develop and prosper is by the promotion of them through cooperation in
spatially specific areas. Industrial districts composed of SMEs have been identified in Southern Germany,
Italy, Spain, Denmark, and France among other European Union states. But successful policy requires a real
understanding of the economic advantages of organizing production in spatially specific industrial districts.
The ideas at the heart of clustering and networking are developed in sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this set of
learning materials.
2.2 Marshall and Marshallian Industrial Districts
2.2.1 The Origins of the Industrial District
In part 2.2 we explore the debt that contemporary analysis of governance structures such as networking,
partnership and industrial districts owe to Marshall. We move beyond the standard approach to Marshall
by looking at notions such as trust and cooperation, which are rarely credited to Marshall. From there,
we develop the notion that Marshall needs to be observed beyond the neo-classical framework with which
he is usually associated. In particular we explore the possibility that Marshall can be observed as an
institutionalist/evolutionary economist. If this is the case then a further debt to Marshall should be
acknowledged. Recent work on “knowledge based” economies discusses the establishment of the institutional
framework to develop such an economy in an evolutionary way.
Much of the contemporary research on industrial districts notes a link with Marshall, but the richness of
these districts in Marshall’s original writings is often ignored. A fuller interpretation can be found in Loasby
(1986), (1990), O’Brien (1990), Jensen (1990), Foster (1993) Hodgson (1993) among others who discuss an
institutional reading of Marshall. The reason for such a reading has already been outlined, namely that
Marshall is observed as being nothing but “the father” of neo-classical economics. To fully appreciate the
significance of Marshall in relation to the original analysis of industrial districts, we initially outline his analysis
of them. We then identify what we believe to be a significant contribution made by Marshall in his analysis
but missed by contemporary researchers: the notion of “constructive cooperation”.5 Extrapolating from
this notion, we then argue to argue that there is more to Marshall than a narrow, neo-classicist, equilibrium
interpretation would suggest and that an evolutionary reading is required to fully appreciate the significance
of Marshall’s industrial analysis.
2.2.2 Industrial Districts and Marshall
Marshall’s ‘discovery’ of industrial districts arose primarily out of his empirical studies of the steel and textile
industries, principally in the United Kingdom. Building on Adam Smith’s recognition of the benefits of
specialization,6 Marshall established that within these industries, the greater the opportunities that existed to
split up the production process, the greater the chances were that specialist firms would develop. In discussing
the nature of production in Principles of Economics (1916),7 Marshall saw the benefits of production accruing
to the individual large firm as being differentiated between internal economies of scale and those arising
to the industry as a whole, or external economies: “We may divide the economies arising from an increase
in the scale of production of any kind of goods, into two classes -firstly, those dependent on the general
development of the industry; and, secondly, those dependent on the resources of the individual houses of
business engaged in it, on their organization and the efficiency of their management. We may call the former
external economies, and the latter internal economies” (266).8
Which of these two economies Marshall perceived as more important varied from industry to industry.
Because of this Marshall’s works sometimes stress the importance of internal economies, and other times
they stress external economies. In Industry and Trade (1932), for example, he says that “with the growth of
capital, the development of machinery, and the improvement of the means of communication, the importance
5An exception to this is Bellandi in Goodman et al. (1989) who discusses constructive cooperation in relation to Business
Associations, which is where Marshall makes first reference to the concept. Our point is that the organization of a Business
Association formalizes the institution of constructive cooperation.
6See for example A. Smith (1976) vol. 1, p. 13-24.
7All references to the Principles of Economics will be to the 7th edition 1916.
8Principles p. 266
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of internal economies has increased steadily and fast” (167).9 In Principles of Economics, though, he
argues that “external economies are constantly growing in importance [relative] to internal in all matters of
Trade-knowledge” (284)10 This apparent contradiction can be attributed partly to the growth of joint stock
companies taking place at the time Marshall was writing and partly to the empiricist methodology he adopted.
O’Brien, in discussing the relationship between small firms and joint stock businesses in Marshall, argues
that Marshall, realizing the enormous advantages that internal economies brought to joint stock companies,
believed that “the path of economic development offered few long-term portents favourable to the small firm”
(1990, 75).11 Hints of Marshall’s empiricist methodology can be observed within the subtext of Industry and
Trade. Marshall himself defined the work as “A study of industrial technique and business organization” and
O’Brien argues that it is precisely that, a study of different types of firm organization and production.12
Loasby (1990) argues that the problem in discerning which industries accrue greater advantages from internal
economies and which from external economies is compounded by “Marshall’s discussion of localisation (which)
cuts across his distinction between the organisation of businesses in the same trade and the organisation of
various trades relatively to one another, being concerned sometimes with relations between similar firms and
sometimes with firms whose activities are complementary” (112). Loasby argues that “localisation,” along
with specialization (which means the production process13 can be broken up into smaller stages, thereby
allowing small specialized firms to fulfill a part of the total production process) are ways in which small firms
can accrue external economies of scale and thus overcome the disadvantages which arise due to their size.
Though Loasby’s point is well taken, there is no doubting Marshall’s belief that the achievement of external
economies “can often be secured by the concentration of many small businesses of a similar character in
particular localities: or as is commonly said, by the localisation of industry”.14 In effect this localization
of industry can be an alternative to larger size for the individual enterprise.15 This point is reinforced by
Marshall’s view of the organization within particular industries: “For instance,” he says, “in cotton spinning,
and calico weaving, a comparatively small factory will hold its own and give constant employment to the
best known machines for every process: so that a larger factory is only several parallel smaller factories
under one roof; and indeed some cotton spinners, when enlarging their works, think it best to add a weaving
department”.16 The various economies of scale arising from the different methods of industrial organization
within Marshallian industrial districts have been highlighted elsewhere (Oughton and Whittam, 1997).
To Marshall, specialization “in large measure dispensed with the necessity of any complex arrangements
in each individual business, since the external economies, which even a small business thus obtained, were
generally far more important to it than those which the largest business in the world could obtain by its
own efforts...”.17 It was the coupling, then, of localization and specialization that gave rise to the notion of
industrial districts. To Marshall, industrial districts are not exclusively the preserve of small firms; indeed, he
comments: “The largest industries, and especially those that need massive plant, are located increasingly
in industrial districts... ”.18 But small firms, by providing inputs and specialist finishing, can also accrue
external economies from being located in industrial districts, as the first of the two quotes makes clear.
In addition to external economies arising out of production, Marshall identifies benefits arising out of
agglomerations, such as skilled labor, capital and infrastructure. In his observation of one industrial district,
he noted that “the trading functions of the city developed. Warehouses for the products of the district
took the place of factories: shops for the accommodation of the district were enlarged; and banks and
mercantile houses of all kinds became prominent”.19 A further benefit coming from the location of industry
9Industry and Trade p. 167
10Principles p. 284
11O’Brien (1990, 75)
12“One year passed much like another. In vacations, either at home or abroad, we spent some time in towns, seeing factories
and workshops...One year we would go to the pottery district with its problems of localisation of industry and changing










in a particular district is what Marshall describes as an “industrial atmosphere.” In Principles of Economics
he describes how such an atmosphere develops: “When an industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it
is likely to stay there long: so great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get
from neighborhood to one another. The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in
the air, and children learn many of them unconsciously”.20 The establishment of an industrial atmosphere
thus takes on the appearance of a public good, with skills being constantly developed and interchanged. The
interaction that leads to children achieving skills leads in turn to the exchange of ideas, which results in
innovation within the district. Marshall continues: “if one man starts a new idea, it is taken up by others and
combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes a source of further ideas”.21 The “industrial
atmosphere” leads to a long-term commitment of an industry to a particular district. Marshall identified
this trait in his description of industrial atmospheres in Sheffield and Solingen. The two areas, he said,
“yield gratis to the manufacturers of cutlery great advantages, that are not easily to be had elsewhere: and
an atmosphere cannot be moved”.22 Once industrial districts become established they are relatively stable
productive systems. Marshall concluded that “an established centre of specialised skill, unless dominated by
a guild or trade-union of an exceptionally obstructive character, is generally in a position to turn to account
quickly any new departure affecting its work; and if the change comes gradually, there is no particular time
at which strong incitement is offered to open up the industry elsewhere”.23
But industrial systems are also dynamic systems, the dynamism being created by the constant interaction
of the actors involved. Marshall argues that merchants not only purchase goods but also “discuss with
the manufacturer himself any suggestions which may occur to them for modifications in detail, to suit
their individual judgments, or to meet the special tastes or requirements of localities with which they are
connected”.24
Much of what has been stated in this paper so far merely establishes Marshall’s analysis of industrial
production. Our comments regarding industrial districts are typically cited by researchers of contemporary
industrial districts in arguing that they are Marshallian. Some researchers, have, however, argued that
contemporary industrial districts differ from industrial districts as identified by Marshall in the degree of
cooperation, trust and networking relationships that they exhibit. We argue instead that much of the current
research fails to note that Marshall himself identified the significance of cooperation within his analysis of
industrial districts.
2.2.3 Marshall and Constructive Cooperation
The continual interaction of buyers, sellers and producers resulted in more than an industrial atmosphere,
Marshall coined the term “constructive cooperation” to identify one of the factors which gave industrial
districts a competitive edge. In examining Britain’s strengths in comparison to Germany and the United
States he argued “that the strong individuality of the British race may find its highest development under
the guidance of the spirit of constructive cooperation”.25 This cooperation enables even “moderate sized”
businesses to compete with much larger competitors “provided these qualities are united with a frank
willingness to learn from others; and to cooperate genially with others in matters in which unfettered
association has large opportunities”.26 The economies which accrue to medium sized businesses, enabling
them to compete with larger competitors, arise out of the evolution of new organizations which are directly
the result of the development of constructive cooperation, which arose out of the constant interaction within
the industrial districts.
According to Marshall this constructive cooperation was counter to the negative aspects of cartelisation,
which resulted in the price fixing identified in many branches of German industry. In Britain It was not
deliberate policy that gave rise to constructive cooperation, rather the organization of production gave rise to









it was also of reasoned analysis of the ‘natural’ tendency to such division and organisation of labour as is
needed to make it collectively efficient”.27 Marshall cites the textile industry as being typical of this natural
development: “The high automatic organisation of these industries, is in great measure due to the fact that
their plant is made in their own districts, with constant intercommunication of ideas between machine makers
and machine users”.28
This constructive cooperation led to the establishment of new institutions to further the potential advantages
which could arise out of cooperation. Marshall cites such examples as “The British Pottery Manufacturers’
Association,” which had among its purposes “To deal with the quality, supply, purchase, and control of raw
materials and stores, where desirable, in the interests of the members; to deal with all questions relative to
cost and conditions of transport; to consider means of facilitating the extension of export trade; to bring
about closer cooperation with the technical arts, and designs sections of the pottery schools; to promote
general propaganda, and to undertake advertising in connection with the industry; to consider the best means
of encouraging and utilizing improvements, inventions, and patents for the general good and advancement
of the industry; to deal with all matters connected with more economical production, including costing; to
watch national and local legislation affecting the industry ...Experts are to be appointed, and assistance given
to members in overcoming the technical difficulties which constantly arise in so complex an industry; and the
Federation has power to purchase, work, and exploit any patents, secret processes, or other improvements in
the general interests of the members”.29
Other similar organizations cited by Marshall include The Bradford Dyers’ Association and the ‘Fine Cotton
Spinners’ and Doublers’ Association, which also employed skilled personnel “for dealing with every part of a
cotton spinning mill, who are too expensive to be employed by a single firm; but are in effect available for
all”.30 The services being provided by these three associations are extremely similar to those being provided
by the “Industry Specific Service Centres” of the Third Italy over half a century later and which have been
identified has being of crucial importance to the success of the industrial districts in the regions making up
the Third Italy. Although we focus on the Third Italy in section 6 it would be pertinent to briefly highlight
some of the cooperation occurring in these contemporary industrial districts there.
Quasi private-public service centers, such as the Regional Board for Economic Development (ERVET)
supervise the development and upgrading of the region of Emilia-Romagna as a whole by such measures
as infrastructural improvements and the provision of training and research facilities. Furthermore, an
examination of the services provided by an organization such as CESMA, which is a service center for farm
machinery organized by ERVET, reveals the following: research, technological consultancy, products quality
assurance, quality systems processes and certification. (ERVET 1990). Further support services can be
obtained from individual industrial sector centers, specific to their own industry, to assist with such activities
as exporting, technical developments and provision of access to computer aided design (CAD) systems, for
example. Associations such as the Confederation of Artisans (CNA) typically provide accountancy services
for member firms. These democratically elected and accountable bodies enable participating firms to achieve
external economies of scale. Elsewhere we have identified the different types of external economies accruing
within the industrial districts of Emilia-Romagna (Oughton and Whittam 1996).
There is a spatial dimension to the organizations cited by Marshall that gives them a further similarity with
the “Real Service Centres” found in the Third Italy. Although Marshall believed there was a lot more to be
done, he identified “constructive cooperation” existing in the promotion of exports through organizations such
as chambers of commerce: “there remain great gaps in the work to be done: and accordingly the ‘Federation
of British Industries’ has set itself to promote the formation of representative Associations for particular
industries; ‘to collect them their leading members into a central federation for dealing with matters of common
interest to all industries, and for mutual support’: to allot to each industry or trade a duly proportionate
‘voice in the discussion and decision of questions of promotion and development of British trade”’.31
This overview of the establishment of industrial districts in Marshall leads us to an examination of the existing
27Marshall (1932, 600)
28Marshall (1932, 603)




literature on contemporary industrial districts and to identify its limited interpretation of Marshall. Although
all researchers in the field of what can loosely be called industrial districts recognize the establishment of
cooperation and trust as being essential for the success of these districts, it is argued by some that cooperation
and trust signify a difference between these districts and the industrial districts identified by Marshall
Harrison32 for example, while providing a comprehensive account of the literature on Marshallian analyses of
industrial districts argues that the districts of Emilia-Romagna are more than “old wine in new bottles”. In
particular, he uses Becattini’s phrase “localized thickening”33 to explain how the “new” theories of industrial
districts differ from “neo-classical economic theories of externality and agglomeration (which) seem to miss
important -perhaps the most important- elements of the construct” (Harrison, 1992, 475). Thus Harrison
argues that standard neo-classical economics is not sufficient to deal with the concepts of industrial districts.
A reading of Marshall does in fact lend itself to an analysis of industrial districts using “new” as well as
“old” theories. Such a reading is possible because there are what Jensen (1990) refers to as “institutional
signposts” within Marshall, particularly, in Marshall’s analysis of industrial production within industrial
districts outlined in Principles of Economics and perhaps more pertinently in Industry and Trade.
What Harrison does not make clear is how the “localised thickening” differs from the “constructive cooperation”
between key players that Marshall identified as occurring within industrial districts he observed. We have
already noted the similarity in services provided by differing organizations, notably the British Pottery
Manufacturers’ Association and the “Real Service Centres” of the Third Italy. “Constructive cooperation”
requires the establishment of trust. The constant interaction of the actors within Marshall’s industrial districts,
leading to innovation and the sharing of skilled personnel and machinery, must rely on the development of
trusting relationships and the “localized thickening” of community relations identified as being of crucial
importance in contemporary industrial districts.
In a similar vein Wilkinson and You, while noting Marshall’s reservations regarding various types of
organizations,34 fail to comment on Marshall’s emphasis on the benefits of constructive cooperation which
may exist “without any apparent drift to use it as a means of maintaining prices at higher levels”.35 They
do note the different emphasis placed by contemporary analyses on concepts such as trust and cooperation.
We would argue, though, that the difference between contemporary analyses and those of Marshall is in
the emphasis they place in trust and cooperation rather than in whether they see trust and cooperation as
valid principles. Similarly, Becattini36, in exploring “The Marshallian industrial districts as a socio-economic
notion” notes the establishment of a common value system, within the industrial districts of the Third Italy,
but argues that it is necessary to use disciplines rather than economics to fully understand the nature of this
phenomena. Becattini fails to draw on evidence that Marshall readily identified the role and function of a
common value system and the beneficial impact this can have on the production process and the facilitating
of exchange. In discussing industrial districts within Marshall, Zeitlin37 similarly fails to discuss the nature
of constructive cooperation found within Marshall. He refers to the usual establishment of an “industrial
atmosphere” as being one of the features typically found within the industrial districts identified by Marshall.
The “thickening process” of rich networking relationships, typical of industrial districts, which we have argued
exist within Marshall, is only noted, according to Zeitlin, by contemporary researchers of industrial districts.
A possible reason for this oversight within the existing literature could be that researchers observe Marshall
merely has a neo-classical economist.
In part 2.2 of the learning materials we have observed the production process as outlined by Marshall,
with specific references being made to his industrial districts and the limited interpretation of Marshall by
contemporary researchers. Regarding the development of industrial production as observed by Marshall, we
have highlighted the link between greater specialization and the development of the organism as a whole, that
is the synergy effects of industrial organization, summarized by Marshall in the following quote: “This central
unity is set forth in the general rule, to which there are not very many exceptions, that the development of
the organism, whether social or physical, involves an increasing subdivision of functions between its separate
32Harrison B. (1992) Industrial Districts: Old Wine in New Bottles? Regional Studies, 26, 5, 469-483
33Becattini (1989, 132)
34Wilkinson and You (1992 footnote 10. p. 7)
35Marshall (1932, 604)
36Becattini (1990)
37Zeitlin in F. Pyke and W. Sengenberger (1992)
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parts on the one hand, and on the other a more intimate connection between them”.38 It is to a more
detailed examination of this link which we now turn to highlight the function of trust and cooperation within
Marshall which leads to an institutional/evolutionary reading of Marshall, which, if adopted, would prevent
the misinterpretation of Marshall by current researchers in the area of industrial districts.
2.2.4 Marshall and Institutional/Evolutionary Economics
Part 2.2.3 examines Marshall’s analysis of industrial production places Marshall within the existing evolutionary
economics literature, indicating that there is more to Marshall than a static equilibrium reading of Principles
of Economics could imply. In particular, Foster (1993), provides a convincing argument of “time irreversibility”
which leads to an evolutionary approach to be observed within Marshall. This approach is reinforced by
Hodgson (1993) and Jensen (1990), whose identification of “institutional signposts” within Marshall has been
mentioned. In terms of industrial production specifically, Loasby (1990), suggests that the emphasis placed on
organization by Marshall leads to a consideration that organization “might be identified as a distinct factor
of production” (Loasby, 1990, 111). It is precisely the organization within industrial districts both in the
original Marshallian sense, and the contemporary usage of the term, which gives these regions a competitive
edge, and makes them of interest to contemporary researchers and policymakers.
Organization is the general rule which underpins Marshall’s analysis of the entire production process.
Cooperation in the sharing of knowledge (which leads to increased innovation) and the development of an
industrial atmosphere (which results in the establishment of new organizations that facilitate production
and trade, namely constructive cooperation) both derive from this general rule. Implicit in Marshall is an
evolutionary approach to industrial organization; this approach, we would argue, underlies the whole of
Marshall’s economic analysis. It is by adopting an evolutionary reading that links between Marshall’s original
industrial districts and contemporary industrial districts can best be understood. The intimate connection
is the development of trust and cooperation that we have identified within Marshall’s original industrial
districts.
The trust underlying constructive cooperation develops through relationships that evolve through interaction
within markets, as the following citation makes clear: “Everyone buys, and nearly every producer sells, to
some extent in a ‘general’ market, in which he is on about the same footing with others around him. But
nearly everyone has also some ‘particular’ markets; that is, some people or groups of people with whom he is in
somewhat close touch: mutual knowledge and trust lead him to approach them, and them to approach him, in
preference to strangers”.39 It is through everyday market relationships that situations of trust are established.
Industrial districts consist of particular markets where producers and consumers cease to be strangers. Within
the industrial district systems of production this trust evolves into an institution transcending strict market
relations, that of constructive cooperation (Gambetta 1998). This new institution paves the way for the
evolution of new organizations such as the British Pottery Manufacturers’ Association.
This identification within Marshall’s industrial districts of evolving social institutions leads to a reading of
Marshall which takes account of the role of tradition, custom, habit and legal restraint. In other words, we are
arguing that there is more to Marshall than a narrow neo-classical reading will permit. The establishment of
the social institutions facilitates the development of economic relations which enable SMEs to exploit external
economies of scale and to reap an economic advantage from being organized in close-knit, geographicallyspecific
economic units.
In analyzing trust in industrial districts for facilitating exchange, Dei Ottati (1994) distinguishes between
cooperation and trust as collective and as personal capital. We would argue that the quotes we have provided
above indicate that within the strict Marshallian industrial district trust and cooperation are observed to be
both personal and collective. They are personal in that individual traders and producers engage in discourse to
improve innovation, collective in that the establishment of an industrial atmosphere results in the achievement
of “public goods.” For trust and cooperation to succeed requires an effective enforcement mechanism, whether
formal or informal. Within any organization such as The Bradford Dyers’ Association, members who broke




rules and norms, that is, institutions, actors who do not comply can be shunned. However, it would be
beneficial not to have to rely on enforcement mechanisms to safeguard the cooperative outcome. Within
Marshall we can observe the potential of trusting relationships evolving out of cooperation. Initially this
cooperation develops through the market mechanism, “the general market” but in “particular markets”, in our
case the productive systems of industrial districts, “mutual knowledge and trust” evolve. The establishment
of cooperative behavior and trusting relationships develops into beneficial outcomes in terms of product
innovation, the sharing of knowledge, information, productive capital and personnel to such an extent that
Marshall can describe the achievement of an “industrial atmosphere” and the establishment of “constructive
cooperation.” The informality of these phrases suggest cooperation and trust being achieved without resort
to formal enforcement mechanisms.
The achievement of a productive system based on cooperation and trust undoubtedly leads to economic
efficiency and “is an important lubricant of a social system.” (Arrow, 1974, 23). In this role of lubricant of
the social system Arrow discusses how lack of trust can lead to inefficient outcomes. “Collective undertakings
of any kind, not merely governmental, become difficult or impossible not only because A may betray B but
because even if A wants to trust B he knows that B is unlikely to trust him”.40 The achievement of an
“industrial atmosphere” and “constructive cooperation” can overcome these inferior outcomes. Furthermore,
Hirschmann makes the point that trust, cooperation, collective action and the like, are different than other
goods and services in that the more they are used the greater they become, although there is a limit to
goodwill: “they atrophy when not adequately practiced and appealed to by the ruling socioeconomic regime,
yet will once again make themselves scarce when preached and relied on to excess”.41 So within Marshall’s
industrial districts we would argue that through individual action the actors developed an atmosphere in
which cooperation and trust developed to such an extent that they became the norms of behavior. The
establishment of such a culture led to the achievement of public goods and the creation of dynamic efficient
economic systems. These systems led to the formalization of the institutions into organizations to facilitate
the evolution of the industrial districts. This interpretation of industrial production found within Marshall,
we would argue, requires reading Marshall in the light of an institutional/evolutionary framework. We have
argued that reading Marshall merely as a neo-classical economist can lead the reader to miss many important




3 Theoretical and Discipline Uunderpinnings to Governance, In-
stitutional Change and Regional Development
3.1 Background
The study of governance and institutional change has come relatively recently to regional science. A range of
methodologies is being applied to this study by researchers and commentators. Without recourse to a range
of disciplines, it is not possible to gain an understanding of the matrix of forms and structures that have
been implemented across the developed world. Theoretical bases for the critical assessment of case studies
and the variety of institutional frameworks to be studied are essential for the researcher trying to compare
and contrast the different frameworks. A corollary is that no one discipline or approach has been adopted
universally to explain the development of governance and institutions within or between countries.
The above discussions on the origins of the concepts of the industrial district, networking and partnerships,
and in particular the role of Marshall in identifying and developing these concepts, should serve to stress the
need for caution in studying governance and institutional change. Much of the literature of the last twenty
years has failed to acknowledge what earlier analysts have uncovered. Adopting a narrow discipline route to
enlightenment can be damaging and wasteful, therefore, with critiques and self-critiques following the initial
flush of enthusiasm. Below, the need to address a broad range of material is suggested, and the reader is
encouraged to consider the arguments of a range of disciplines and paradigms.
In material on regional governance, institutions and economic development, a number of theoretical approaches
have been applied which owe their origins to American studies. Although some of these translate well to the
European environment, including the organizational theories of DiMaggio and Powell, others are less able to
travel successfully. A good example of this problem has been demonstrated by Wong (1999, chapter 4) who
shows that urban regime theory contains predictions that do not do particularly well once they have crossed
the Atlantic.
Other researchers have used developments of institutionalism/network theory, combining aspects of orga-
nizational theory with traditional themes in political science to examine the evolution of partnerships of
organizations and authorities. The increasing concern with the competitiveness of small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs) and the promotion of intelligent regions in the (re-)generation of the economies of particular
areas has been particularly popular. The literature on SMEs often places institutional thickness and capacity
at the heart of the analysis of the economic development process, reflecting a preoccupation with a paradigm
popular in the 1980s (Macleod 1996).
In discussing multilevel governance, a growth industry in its own right within politics, the “actor-centered”
approach that specifies the role of particular individuals and institutions in the decision-making process
(Marks et al. 1996, 346) has frequently been adopted in explaining some of the developments within Europe.
In contrast, at the national level, the “power-dependence” approach has been applied to aid understanding of
the relationship between central government and sub-central public bodies (Rhodes 1988). To an extent, the
“policy network” approach addressed by such economists as Halkier (1999) goes some way toward highlighting
the associations between these two theories in its recognition of the importance of a multitude of actors
exchanging information, expertise and other resources at both the national and supra-national (e.g. European
levels).
With the apparently contradictory movements towards both greater powers for supra-national bodies such as
the European Union on the one hand, and enhanced devolution to sub-national levels on the other, the theme
of this set of learning materials will become ever more crucial. A better understanding of the underpinnings of
successful regional governance structures and regional institutions will be an essential feature in determining
the sustainable development of communities across the developed world, and of Europe especially.
3.2 Partnership and Regional Development
Over the last two decades, it has become increasingly apparent that to promote the development of a
region requires not only intervention from the state at the supra-national (e.g. European, national, or sub-
national/local level) but also reliance on more than one particular agency. Regional economic development is
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no longer considered the responsibility of just one organization, be it central government or a regionally-based
development agency or organization. Instead, a range of institutions have become involved, some of them
local, some regional, and others again acting on behalf of national or European institutions.28 In the main,
these agencies work collectively in partnerships or networks on a more or less regular and formalized basis,
and many of them will be involved in partnership arrangements with private sector organizations and actors.
This is in contrast to the 1970s and 80s, when regional development usually involved one agency deciding the
appropriate strategies and undertaking the necessary steps to implement such initiatives. As the millennium
approaches, regional development bodies appear to be essentially networked organizations, achieving their
objectives by working in partnership with other public and private actors.
Given this background and the emphasis put on trust and cooperation in industrial and regional policies,
one can see why it is consistent with the political economy of the current period that partnerships have
become the preferred mode of regional development. Indeed, the partnership approach is perceived as being
so favorable that any self-respecting development agency adopts it as an integral part of its mode of operation.
It could be argued that this form of delivering regional economic development activities has come to be
hegemonic simply as a consequence of its having become ubiquitous. The mantra-like status of partnerships
may obscure the fact that operating through them could involve disadvantages (Halkier et al. 1999; Danson
et al. 1997).
A more balanced view of regional development is needed. Just looking at the possible reasons for engaging
in partnership arrangements would seem to suggest the need for caution. Building consensus and pooling
resources to ensure coordinated efforts and efficient implementation will in many cases entail very real
advantages, and may well be an important part of the real reasoning behind the growth of the networked
development agency (Halkier and Damborg, 1999). But it is also clear that the current popularity of
partnership arrangements is rooted in the specific historical circumstances of the last decade. The decline
of central government regional subsidies that fueled the growth of bottom-up initiatives into an uneven
web of regional and local development organizations, and the 1988 reforms of the Structural Funds, made
partnership a general requirement in European regional programs. In addition to this decline, public-sector
bodies with limited resources have been constantly searching for ways of enhancing their capacity to promote
development. Meanwhile, the experience of the Third Italy, where consensual networking appeared to be
the secret behind a thriving regional economy, has been well publicized. It is easy to see why partnership is
construed as the new panacea. The motives of a development agency for linking up with other public and
private bodies may be a combination of push and pull factors: on the one hand the search for functional
advantages, on the other hand a constant quest for additional resources from other public and private actors.
There are two aspects of partnership which can be highlighted. First is the question of the motives and interests
of the partners involved. These can be expected to differ between public and private actors and various
tiers of government, and between divergent economic interests, different time perspectives, incompatible
strategies, and territorial politics. These differences could all make it difficult for partners to gain the potential
benefits of collaboration. Second, once partnership arrangements have been established, the question of their
consequences for the participating organizations arises. The short-term effect for most participants is, they
would hope, access to additional resources, and perhaps synergies in delivery and monitoring. However, as the
links and associations between the partners become institutionalized, there are questions over the influence
the participating organizations will have on each partner in the medium to long term.
Cameron and Danson (1999) have argued that by looking at partnerships and networks among agencies
and institutions within a region from the perspective of organizational theory, using Scotland as a case
study, insights can be gained into how these bodies are affected by new forms of cooperative governance.
Exploring especially the effects these new forms have on development bodies and the ways that partnerships
may challenge traditional perceptions of the advantages of both regional development agencies (RDAs) and
networking leads one to see that there is a possibility of significant problems for these institutions and their
political sponsors.
28The emphasis on the European experience follows from the particular institutional and political environment on this
continent. Because the member states of the European Union operate neither as a single entity - as a political body or nation
state, federal or otherwise - nor as a set of totally independent countries, the paths of evolution of their institutional structures
of governance can demonstrate a range of experiences. They each are restricted by the overall regulatory framework of the
European Union, but they have acted as a laboratory for alternative forms of institutional intervention in the regional economy.
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Others, in their analysis of the process of consensus building and strategy development, highlight the
importance of communicative aspects of regional development activities. Jud and Steiner (1999) do so in
considering recent experiences in the Austrian region of Styria.
By exploring the workings of partnerships in the English context, Wong (1999) has questioned some of the
central assumptions of urban regime theory about the role of private and public actors in partnerships. She
has undertaken extensive analysis of the views of development practitioners in the organizations involved in
regional and urban economic development, and raised doubts about urban regime theory itself. In doing so,
she has also confirmed the need to consider the particular economic, political and social environments within
which governance structures and institutions operate.
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3.3 Networking and Regional Governance
Across the European Union, if not the developed world, over the past two decades there has been an expansion
in the reliance on joint actions between institutions and between different levels of government to address
many of the issues facing contemporary society. Looser than many formal partnerships, and often based
on perceived mutuality of problems and policies, local and regional organizations increasingly have been
coming together to address issues that face them individually and collectively. The association of traditional
industrial regions (RETI) was an early example of this in the European Union, with joint intelligence and
lobbying efforts funded through its member councils and authorities. Sector-specific bodies have been created
with similar remits, one of the best examples being MILAN - the network of European regions involved in
the vehicle industry.
In a national context, such associations have been long established. One example is the Convention of Scottish
Local Authorities (COSLA), which has provided a platform for debate and the defining of common agenda and
best practices. In Germany, the Federal Ministry for Spatial Planning, Building and Urban Development has
prompted the construction of eleven city networks under the ExWoSt program over the period 1994-97 (Eser
1997). However, although these organizations and initiatives are fairly formal structures, the reality for many
networks is that they are often ad hoc ways of addressing the problems of policy coordination, destructive
competition among agencies, or a lack of institutional capacity at the local or the regional level. Improving
accountability, albeit often indirectly, and adopting an integrated approach to policy administration and
delivery are two of the main areas where networks have been embraced. Rhodes (1986) and Leonardi and
Nanettit (1990) have explored some of the possible forms of relationships among the supra-national state
(the European Union), the nation state, and lower levels of governance. (see Figure 3.2)
Figure 3.2
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By considering the practices and experiences across a range of very different environments it is possible to
examine the role of looser governance structures. For instance, using an institutionalist framework Halkier
and Damborg (1999) explore the attempts in North Jutland to enhance the patterns of business development
support by the matrix of agencies in the region. Considering the developments there, they suggest how this
networking approach could be applied to the study of regional governance in other parts of Europe.
In an area trying to come to terms with a poorly developed governance structure, Kafkalas and Thoidou,
basing their work on the case of Central Macedonia, assess the importance of European structural funds for
the emergence of specific RDAs. They have analyzed the significance of the competitiveness of SMEs and
of the gradual establishment of RDAs in the promotion of regional intelligence, and so place institutional
thickness and capacity at the heart of the economic development process.
The United Kingdom, the most centralized state in western Europe, presents a live experiment in significant
changes in governance within a country. Britain has been undergoing the devolution of power to a Parliament
in Scotland - 300 years after Scotland agreed to a union of parliaments with England - and to regional
assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland. The possibility also exists for devolution of power to regional
assemblies in the English regions. Garside, among others, has critically examined the present plans for new
forms of regional governance in the constituent parts of Britain, contrasting the proposals for Scotland and
Wales with those for the English regions. Basing much of his discussion on the importance of democracy and
inclusion, he points out the key role played by networks in the success of the Celtic nations, in comparison
with the limited devolution existing and promised for the sub-national parts of England. The recent edited
volume by Newlands and McCarthy (1999) is one of the few but growing attempts by regional scientists
to address the economic implications of such developments; till now they have tended to be the domain of
political scientists and commentators.
Bennett and McCoshan (1993) have suggested a typology of networks (Figure 3.3) which describes a range
of relations between agents at the local or regional level. As they note, the networks A-D are derived from
management science, and each has advantages and disadvantages in delivering economic development activities
efficiently and sustainably. The introduction of the fifth form, E, is meant to be flexible and responsive to the
needs of different agents.
Figure3.3
Two Swedish researchers, Jensen and Leijon, have adopted a very different approach to the study of
developments in regional governance structures. Drawing from experiences in West Sweden, they apply
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rhetorical analytical forms to describe the social construction of this particular region, explaining how
some of the actors used imagery and “persuasive storytelling” to create a region. Their examination of
regional networks and institutional landscapes, the creation of artificial regions and the inevitable consequent
inconsistencies with perceived realities provides a stimulating way of considering the importance of regional
structures in the development process. They stress the significance of political dialogue in persuading and
forming the debate over not only the nature of governance institutions but also the very existence of regions
themselves. This raises the age-old but critical question “what is a region?”, a problem for regional scientists
that has presented itself at various times and with varying strengths over the decades.
3.4 Regional Development and Multilevel Governance
As demonstrated widely in individual country and continent-wide studies over the last few decades (see Yuill
et al., 1998 for instance), the role of traditional central government regional subsidy programs has been
gradually replaced by bottom-up development bodies and initiatives. The changing structure of regional
policy throughout Europe has been assisted and encouraged by the increasing importance of the European
Union system of governance, with the structural funding programs critical in this process. There is a need to
identify and delineate the development of the governance structures in each country and in the European
Union to understand and to explain the emerging pattern of change towards a multilevel system of governance.
Such research is best conducted using a variety of applicable theories.
Since the inception of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the role of the European Commission
has become increasingly important in the development of the regions within objective areas. The impact of
the European Commission’s method of stimulating regional development through bottom-up initiatives and
programs has not only affected the assigned areas but also has had direct implications for national regional
policy developments throughout the European Union. A similar process of change can be identified outside
the European system. It may be important, then, to consider where the process of change originated. Has
the change towards bottom-up regional policy been brought about by the desire of national governments
to empower the regional agents and reduce their own direct role in regional development, and/or has the
European model been accepted elsewhere as the most effective and efficient method of regional development?
The relationships between different tiers of government may be studied from a number of different perspectives.
On the European Level the so called “multilevel governance” approach proposes that “decision-making
competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by state executives,” and that
it is therefore necessary to adopt an “actor-centered” approach that specifies the role of particular individuals
and institutions in the decision making process (Marks et al. 1996, 346).
On the National Level, parallel arguments can be found in the “power-dependence” approach, which was
developed to aid understanding of the relationship between central government and sub-central public bodies
(Rhodes 1988). The multilevel governance and power-dependence approaches both identify the mutual
dependence between different tiers of government based on their respective control of resources important for
the development and implementation of public policy. Adding weight to the debates on “multilevel governance”
and “power dependence” is the “policy network” approach. This approach also recognizes the importance of a
multitude of actors exchanging information, expertise and other resources at both the national and European
levels.
Discussion of the approaches that are implemented or can be implemented is continued at the Regional
Level. Analyses of the recent suggestions for change in the electoral system have evoked debate over whether
democratic principles and regional government are necessarily a more beneficial system for the effectiveness
and efficiency of regional policy, or whether current agents may in fact be superior.
Consideration of the work of several academics allows an understanding of how the debate has developed and
gives a thorough explanation of policy implementation at a number of levels. For example, in his evaluation
of Norwegian regional policy Bukve notes the change from a system in which there was a high degree of
autonomy for the political bodies at the county level to one in which governance, rather than government,
has become increasingly evident. By doing so, he demonstrates the need to look at the particulars of a
region’s environment. Because Norway is not a member of the European Union, Bukve’s work lends insight
into governance across the European continent. Likewise, Halkier (1999) has considered the consequences of
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recent radical change in Danish regional policy toward regional governance and empowerment and shown
how experiences can differ even between near neighbours - such as Denmark and its Nordic associates
Sweden and Norway. And Downes (1999) has assessed the Austrian system and the way in which joining
the European Community has affected the regional policies and actors of the strongly consensus-oriented
political environment.
3.5 The links between networking and partnerships
As is apparent from above, within the regional economic development structure of the late twentieth century,
there appears to be a dominant partnership model approach that stresses the possibility of realizing synergies
and capturing positive externalities through formal networking. In many regions, the form of institution
favored to address regional market failure, the RDA, is being encouraged to relate more closely to the other
economic actors in regeneration and restructuring. Some have argued that this points them toward a role as
a facilitator, enabler or catalyst in the regional economy (Morgan 1998), rather than the multifunctional
all-embracing organization of the 1970s. In the following section, the role of RDAs in differing regional
governance structures is analyzed in more detail. As an introduction to that discourse, we consider below the
links between networking and partnerships.
There is an essential transmogrification implied in the incorporation of the RDA into such partnerships.
Whether there are conflicts and disadvantages to these developments does not appear to have been addressed
in the literature. For instance, it has been suggested that the advantages of partnership include:
• Increasingly innovative policies and better operational decisions arising from dialogue and interaction
among organizations with different responsibilities and perspectives on problems
• Increased continuity and consistency in policy within individual organizations as a result of the building
of trust and understanding with others
• Resolution of conflict and disagreement through widespread consultation and involvement in decision
making
• Coordination and integration of disparate actions and aggregation of separate budgets, to enhance
policy impacts
• High level of strategic planning and decision making through shared agreement reached on essential
needs and priorities (Danson et al. 1997)
To assess these claims, and especially the second advantage, suggests applying a theoretical framework
appropriate to the analysis of organizations working in partnership and through networks.
3.6 Networks and Partnerships
Traditional research in organizational theory has tended to concentrate on intra-firm rather than inter-firm
relationships; however, with the increased interest in networking (Nohria and Eccles 1992) and indeed
partnership, it has become necessary to consider the relationships between organizations in a more structured
way. In addition, the impact that the external (networking) environment may have on the structure, culture
and functioning of the individual organization should have increasing importance as decentralized decision
making, indigenous development and collaborative working in regional economic development become more
common (Cooke and Morgan 1993; Garmise and Rees 1992; Mackintosh 1997).
The Importance of Local Networks
A basic assumption of the relationships formed to provide a network is that the organizations in a network
are mutually dependent upon resources controlled by each other, and that there are benefits to be gained by
pooling their resources. Thus in network forms of resource allocation, organizations do not operate on an
individual basis but relative to all the organizations in their network (Nohria and Eccles 1992; Cooke and
Morgan 1993). In many ways the analysis of cartels and oligopolistic behavior is analogous to this.
Networks are the intricate links based on trust and reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange between
producers and clients that are necessary to ensure economic capability and responsiveness (Grabher 1993).
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Ideal networks enhance market and location decisions; in economic terms, they facilitate the externalities of
decisions becoming internalized to the members. Networks mean that key agents have to work more closely
together to fulfill the needs of those included in, and affected by, the network.
Networks established to deliver economic services are fundamentally local affairs (Bennett and McCoshan
1993). They depend upon the way in which businesses are served by local community and business leaders and
elites, the way in which local networks perform, and the way in which participation in networks takes place
at a local level. However, the character of local networks, their leadership and elites, are also fundamentally
determined by the economic structure and layout of their economies, which in turn depends on the relationship
of the local economy to the national and global economic system. As a result, different types of areas possess
very different types of networks of relationships. For example, there are strong contrasts between older and
newer industrial areas, between areas concentrated on urban settlements and those in more dispersed urban
or rural areas, and so on.
The contrasts of networks between areas create very different possibilities for development. In some areas
networks allow a strong positive lead to be taken which allows the rapid economic change and adjustment
on which service quality is founded (Ricard 1997). In other areas, the absence of an effective network, or a
network tuned to former circumstances, can be a strong inhibition to economic growth. Local networks thus
can be strong supply-side factors that raise or lower the economic growth potential for different parts of the
country (Bennett and McCoshan 1993; Doeringer, Terkla and Topakian 1987).
From Networks to Partnerships
Networks are the essential means for linking one group of agents to others whom they affect and are the
mechanism for the exchange of information and services in support of business development. Beyond simple
networks, partnerships require the commitment of the agents to work fully together. This means:
• Accepting long-term structures that work towards sustained commitment to change and achievement of
quality
• Accepting an active commitment to changing the internal operations of each agent, and helping other
agents also to change to achieve an improved system overall (WMEB Consultants 1995)
Hence networking alone is largely passive, whereas partnerships require active participation (Mackintosh 1992).
Partnerships are based on firm agreements by agents to work together. They extend far beyond network flows
of information to offer a system that ensures that the problem, or the client, is fully addressed. Partnerships
can range from agreements between actors to work together toward a common end, to agreements which form
a legal contract through which specific targets for performance are defined by the contracting parties. Over
this range of possibilities the parties may act as relatively equal partners, but frequently the partnership is not
equal. In some partnerships, the arrangement is more important to one party than to others, or performance
is mandated or coerced by one party on another (frequently through financial powers). The description of the




Networking and Partnerships in the European Context
The European Commission is considered to be one of the main driving forces in the development of partnership,
and therefore in networking behavior, with the aim of achieving the goal of European integration and cohesion
(Bennett and Krebs 1994). As a means of encouraging this behavior many of the Commission’s initiatives
and programs have a pre-requisite that participating organizations must be involved in a partnership or
network (Cooke and Morgan 1993). As highlighted earlier, this is evident in the Commission’s arrangements
for regional policy funding and for accessing structural funds. The aim of these arrangements is to harness
the energy, skills and resources of the key actors in the regional development environment and to develop and
implement solutions to increase cohesion across the European Union. Given the pre-eminent position of the
Strathclyde model in the evolution of this partnership form of delivering structural funds in the European
Union (Danson et al. 1997), sections 5 and 6 introduce some consideration of the model in the analysis of the
micro- and meso-levels of regional governance.
3.7 Summary and introduction to the following sections
This section has given a brief introduction to the major themes of “partnership and regional development,”
“networking and regional governance,” and “regional development and multilevel governance” and the links
between the different levels of analysis. In the following chapters, this analysis is extended, first through
an exploration of the RDA under different models of governance and then an examination in greater detail
of some aspects of these themes. In each case the material will be illustrated by application of the theories
presented to the experiences in particular regions, especially the Third Italy and Scotland.
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4 Economic Development, Regional Governance and the Role of
Development Agencies
4.1 Introduction
Promoting the opportunity to develop the economy more effectively has always been a significant element in
the debate over the future governance of individual regions, especially of regions facing endemic problems.
Such factors as high unemployment, low relative incomes and gross domestic product (GDP), net emigration,
the collapse of a region’s traditional basic industries, and domination by nonlocal capital have all been cited
as reasons for seeking increased indigenous control or other forms of intervention in a regional economy.
However, for many regional economies, with an open economy dependent on the national, continental and
world economic forces (McGregor et al. 1997), there is obviously a constrained policy environment. This
inevitably limits the ability of a regional administration to achieve macroeconomic objectives by following
traditional policies and ways of delivering such policies.
Further, and even within these strictures, for many communities in the European Union (for example, Scotland
under the new devolution arrangements) 28 regional levels of governance will have available only a limited
range of economic powers. Control over fiscal, economic and monetary policy will be reserved for higher
levels. Similarly, the regulation of competition, intellectual property, and research councils will remain under
the power of the central government of the United Kingdom, as will policies pertaining to broad aspects
of transport, energy, the welfare state, trade and assistance to industry. The abilities of regional levels of
governance to intervene at the Scottish level under these constitutional arrangements are not very different
from the powers and instruments available to many regional governments across the developed world.
Because the particular history and geography of a country or region are important in determining the
effectiveness and efficiency of the firms, markets and policies in the country or region in the present, it is
always necessary to have a good idea of such background information. The extended endnote below29 presents
28The House of Commons, 1997
29Scotland has been an independent sovereign country for much of its history. However, in 1603 the Crowns of Scotland and
England were united when James VI of Scotland also became James I of England upon the death of Elizabeth I of England. In
1707, the Act of Union finalized the political union between Scotland and England, which followed legisaltion of that year which
united the parliaments of Scotland and England. This Act, passed by the respective parliaments, provided inter alia for the
Protestant succession to the throne, for uniform taxation and for free trade between Scotland and England. The legislation
preserved the separate Scottish legal, education and ecclesiastical systems. The 1707 Act of Union had a turbulent aftermath.
It led to the Jacobite Rebellions under which attempts were made to regain the British throne for the House of Stuart. This
ended with the Battle of Culloden, the last battle to be fought on British soil, in 1746, when the uprising was crushed with great
brutality.
Immediately after the Jacobite Rebellion came the Age of Enlightenment, an outpouring of philosophical thought, literature,
inventions, architecture and industrial advancement. A critical personality in this period was Adam Smith, whose book The
Wealth of Nations, published in 1776, was a major landmark in the history of economic thought. The period also witnessed the
beginnings of the age of Watt and others, which provided the basis for the transformation of Scotland from an agrarian economy
to the first industrialized nation in the world. There were also advances in agriculture and textiles, and an expansion of trade in
the raw materials needed for Scottish heavy industry.
Although there is a long history of mining of coal and lead in Scotland back to the 13th century, the real development of
industry started only after 1750. From this time onwards, increased trade, large scale immigration to the Central Belt of Scotland
from the Highlands and Islands and from Ireland, and the introduction of major new industries significantly raised the tempo of
Scottish economic life. Clydeside, centerd on Glasgow, became the world leader in the production of coal, chemicals, metals,
engineering, shipbuilding and textiles, making it the most prosperous region in Britain. Dundee secured a position as a center
for the processing of linen and jute, while Edinburgh expanded on the basis of the iindigenous financial and legal sectors, and
established itself alongside Glasgow as a major center of administration and the arts.
These economic changes led to changes to Scotland’s social structure; the population increased from 1.1 million in 1707 to 1.6
million in 1800 and almost 4.5 million by 1900. However, this was accompanied by some of the worst aspects of poverty and
deprivation the world has ever witnessed.
Development continued apace in the nineteenth century, particularly in heavy industry, coalmining, shipbuilding, and
engineering. The economy also diversified into medicine, science, accountancy, banking and commerce. Its educational provision
and achievements were outstanding by any measure, paradoxically leading to high emigration as Scotland exported its skills
and labor force. As described in section 6 below, this rapid advance and inventiveness also sowed the seeds of twentieth
century decline. While there was some restructuring after World War II, this was not enough to prevent further decline and
peripheralization.
Building on Scotland’s surviving institutions from the Act of Union, an increasing degree of administrative devolution of
power was promoted throughout the twentieth century. Nationalist pressure, however, continued to grow culminating in the
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a very brief description of the development of the Scottish economy and institutional structure.
Dow (1997) argues that devolved governments have greater flexibility to intervene in regional economies than
the problems mentioned above may suggest. Indeed, some researchers claim that the success of regional
governance structures in economic policy terms should not be measured by the level or financing of public
expenditure in their region but rather by their impact on the rate of economic growth and development
locally (Newlands 1997).
Increasingly over the last two decades, attention has been turned to what Doeringer (1987) called the “invisible
factors in ... economic development” as the crucial areas for intervention. In this vein, Porter (1990) has
argued for the significance of investment and innovation in explaining the promotion of competitiveness and
productivity, highlighting “R&D, learning, modern facilities and sophisticated training” as key factors. More
generally “new growth” and “endogenous growth” theories follow the Schumpeterian tradition of stressing
the role of competition in creating dynamic change in the economy. Today, an alternative approach that
stresses the specific comparative advantages of areas can be reconciled with these growth theories where
agglomeration economies built on trust, cooperation and innovation are present.
Similarly, the significant role of an infrastructure conducive to innovation and development has been long
associated with the growth pole theories of Perroux. Having fallen out of fashion in policy and research terms
in the 1970s, growth poles are being resurrected in the form of clusters and networking: the underpinnings
of the successful regional economies of the Third Italy and Baden-Württemberg (Whittam 1997). Indeed
these comparators have been cited by the Secretary of State as the way forward for Scotland (Press Release,
February 1998).
In all these competing theories of regional growth, a rationale can be identified for a regional government
intervening in the economy to establish conditions and institutions to promote economic development. The
decline of Keynesian demand management policies and the re-emergence of supply-side concerns has led to
factors which affect costs of production, competitiveness, and to the creation and adoption of technologically
advanced methods of production (Newlands 1997). In these contexts, regional governance structures can be
argued to have the potential to have significant impact on industrial and economic development by introducing
and customizing policies in such areas as training, technology, venture capital, new firm formation and the
ownership of industry. However, as McGregor et al. (1997) and Newlands argue (1997), intervention will not
lead to automatic improvements in such circumstances; rather the need for a policy regime appropriate to
the needs of the particular region’s economy can be critical, as the strategies of the national state may be
inappropriate.
Many commentaries on specific regional economies tend to stress the uniqueness of the political and institutional
environment of that community; in Scotland, for instance, for many years it has been argued that economic
development policy has been determined within Scotland by Scottish institutions (McCrone 1994; Danson et
al. 1990). In many regions facing endemic structural economic problems, a distinctive element in the evolving
picture of their own environments has been the role of the regional development agency (RDA). Within
the regional governance structures, it is often to these established institutions that the regional or national
parliament will look to deliver key policy options and strategies. This section of the learning materials
considers next the typical structural problems of the regional economy, then in parts 4.3 and 4.4 the rationale
for development agencies, followed by their functions and performance. Guiding the deliberations over what
institutional forms and configurations could be adopted, it is argued here, should be four key principles:
accountability, subsidiarity, sustainability, and integration/inclusion. These are defined in part 4.5. Applying
these in part 4.6, we propose how RDAs might be evaluated; part 4.7 considers the role of partnerships. The
concluding part proposes how the development agencies should be reformed to operate more effectively to
meet the aspirations of the community in the region.
re-establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999. Although the Parliament has limited economic powers, and less power
than state legislatures in the United States, further moves are expected in the coming decade. The dynamism in the Scottish
constitutional position suggests that again it is an important indicator of the potential economic implications of political and
governance changes. In many ways Scotland has diverged from England over the last quarter century in its political thought
(a consensual and corporatist culture has coming to dominate Scotland, taking her closer to the European norms) and in its
linkages with the rest of the European Union market. These two developments have made Scotland a critical test case in Europe
for the adoption of North American policies and forms of intervention within an increasing embracing of a European social
partnership approach to managing the economy.
24
4.2 The regional economy
For many regional economies, such problems have become endemic as high and persistent unemployment, net
emigration, declining local traditional industries, a weak indigenous business establishment with low rates
of new firm formation, and a dependence on external investment by multiregional or multinational firms.
Together these factors produce a difficult environment for the growth and development of new enterprises, the
attraction of R&D facilities, and the promotion of self-sustaining regional growth. Selective migration of the
younger, more skilled, educated and enterprising members of the population will exacerbate such problems,
instilling positive feedback mechanisms into the local environment and creating vicious circles of decline.
Coupled with a reluctance to persevere with traditional Keynesian policies of demand management, restricted
in the ability to adopt more interventionist strategies by politics or the regulations of the wider power blocs
(nation, European Union, or equivalent), the move to supply-side policies has encouraged the foundation and
reliance on RDAs.
4.3 Rationale for regional development agencies
Faced with these endemic regional problems and the need to intervene to address market failure, areas
of the United Kingdom have begun to rely on the development agency approach to the promotion of
regional restructuring. In the United Kingdom, with its long history of innovative policy development, the
establishment of the Highlands and Islands Development Board and the Scottish Development Agency (in the
mid-1960s and 70s respectively) and their survival through the Conservative governments of the last eighteen
years have had much to do with the corporatist tradition in Scotland (Fairley and Lloyd 1995). They have also
helped lead to the divergence of politics north and south of the border over this period (Brown, McCrone and
Paterson 1996), and the consensus for intervention in Scotland (McCrone 1994). Many other regions around
the world have followed this strategy and established their own RDAs.30 Whether the Scottish Parliament
empowers local authorities, reabsorbs responsibilities into the Scottish Office departmental structure, or
continues with RDAs will depend as much on political perceptions of the agencies’ potential as on objective
study of their performance against these alternatives. It is to the rationale, structure and roles for the
development agencies under alternative regional governance models that we now turn.
It has been argued that the increased interest in economic development initiatives has helped stimulate greater
“bottom up” development and the development of indigenous potential, compared with many former policies
that tended to be more dominated by “top down” concerns (see for example Stohr 1989). An important part
in this process has been played by semi-autonomous institutions such as RDAs and the European Regional
Development Agencies Association (EURADA).
An RDA can be defined as “a regionally based, publicly financed institution outside the mainstream of central
and local government administration designed to promote economic development.” In their studies of such
bodies across the European continent, a model RDA is defined by Halkier and Danson (1997, 245) as a body
that, first, is in a semi-autonomous position vis-à-vis its sponsoring political authority; second, supports
mainly indigenous firms by means of “soft” policy instruments; and third, is a multifunctional and integrated
agency, the level of which may be determined by the range of policy instruments it uses.
In the United Kingdom, RDAs have been seen as a method of reducing the level of localized market failure in
accordance with and in support of the government’s macroeconomic regional policy instruments and objectives.
Calling on the literature in this field (Haughton and Peck 1991; Lipsey 1983; Pearce 1977), Fairley and Lloyd
(1998) explore the principle of market failure as it applies to development agencies, and again record how
the Scottish agencies tended to widen the definition to allow a broader degree of policy intervention than
the government envisaged. They also incorporate the evolving concept of “government failure” as a reason
posited for restricting intervention; by extension the concept would lead one to support the devolution of
powers to a quasi nongovernmental body more oriented to the needs of the market.
30Halkier, Danson and Damborg, eds, 1998, Regional Development Agencies in Europe, London: JKP is a collection of essays
that elaborate on this topic.
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Figure 4.1 Growth strategies and policy areas
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Figure 4.3 Model RDAs : subgroupings
• relatively large organizations with mixed-traditional policy profiles
• medium to small organizations with mixed-new profiles
• relatively small organizations specializing in new policy areas
Danson, Lloyd and Newlands (1993) argue in support of development agencies as the most effective tool
for addressing such local market failures as risk aversion in the financial sector, poor market information,
externalities in the provision of infrastructure and training, and problems associated with rapid growth and
technological change. Their argument rests on several advantages RDAs seem to hold over other methods of
policy implementation that have been considered, such as local authorities, central government departments,
and private sector-led bodies such as the English UDCs (Urban Development Corporations).
Able to intervene and interact with the economy at the most appropriate jurisdictional level (Armstrong
1997), regional agencies can bring substantial resources to bear on problems of local economic development
by combining regional, industrial and training policies and resources on specific projects. They represent the
26
manageable “bottom-up” alternative, avoiding the bewildering maze of local initiatives now present in many
regions, but they are also flexible and receptive to the specific needs of the indigenous industry within their
regions. A significant problem in the proposals for the RDAs in the English regions (DTER 1998) is their
failure to recognize the difficulties caused by the continued existence of the plethora of bodies and programs
in each region; in the Scottish cases, such additions to the institutional infrastructure were introduced after
the Highlands and Islands Development Board and the Scottish Development Agency were established. A
number of responsibilities which otherwise may be split between different departments or quasi-government
agencies - such as the provision of sites, attraction of industry, environmental improvement, sector strategy,
and urban development - could be located within a single organization to reduce costs and realize synergies
(Moore and Booth 119). In the words of the Trade and Industry Committee, local enterprise companies in
Scotland (LECs) are ‘able to deliver national schemes and programs flexibly, in response to local needs and
circumstances’ (Trade and Industry Committee 1995).
Operationally RDAs frequently combine area and sectoral strategies as opportunities arise, and offer compre-
hensive business services, both functions that could be more difficult to deliver if they were spread across
departments and agencies. More crucial perhaps, as they are at arms’ length from government, RDAs
can develop a degree of operational freedom and credibility that regional departments of government may
lack. They may be able, therefore, to have potential leverage over significant private funds, representing a
strong advantage that an agency will have over the Scottish Parliament itself. In times of high mobility of
multinational capital, such compromises may be necessary to attract and retain jobs, incomes and technologies.
As Halkier and Danson (1995) have noted, because RDAs work “outside the mainstream government,” they
may be able to facilitate the pursuit of public policies without direct government intervention (1). This can
make the development agency approach to regional economic development more acceptable to the full range
of social partners, without necessarily undermining accountability.
Although RDAs can focus on the particular needs of the enterprises and labor force of their areas, they can
also adopt a long-term perspective. Taking a strategic view can allow policies to be followed which are to the
long-run benefit of the region, but which may be unpopular in the immediate period. Thus, relatively isolated
from short term political intervention and maneuverings, RDAs should have the potential to restructure the
economy in a planned way that would lift the development path of indigenous industry onto a higher level,
achieving greater endogenous growth. It can be argued that distance from central government could well be
fundamental to the success of such a strategy. Although the operating environment may be more closely
attuned to the needs of local enterprise, a Scottish development agency can also instill a sense of regional
ownership of economic development strategies while demonstrating a political commitment to the long-term
growth of the economy as a whole. The potential to promote and encourage trust and cooperation through
such an institutional approach can engender further virtuous circles of growth and development, as described
below, in ways that a regional parliament and local authorities cannot.
4.4 Structure and roles of the development agencies
In many ways the specific roles and functions of the Scottish development agencies are less important than
the balance between their objectives and their priorities. There is a broad consensus over the macroeconomic
role of government and over the detailed needs of the Scottish economy. The most significant debate involving
RDAs is over how expenditure should be targeted and on which sectors and areas it should be targeted.
Yet much of the discussion threatens to be concerned with who should have the powers of intervention. In
assessing the present structure and performance of the RDAs we hope to illuminate this debate.
The RDAs for Scotland, Scottish Enterprise (SE) and Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) have responsi-
bility for the integrated delivery of economic and business development initiatives, the provision of training
and the implementation of measures to secure the improvement of the environment in Scotland. According to
a concept long championed by the organization for Scottish trade unions - the STUC, SE and HIE represent
a radical initiative within the Scottish tradition of regional planning for economic development by bringing
together the key factors of capital, labor and land.
SE and HIE aim to stimulate self-sustaining economic development and the growth of enterprise, secure
improvement of the environment, encourage the creation of viable jobs, reduce unemployment, and improve
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the skills of the Scottish work force. The delivery of the integrated enterprise and training services is
subcontracted by SE and HIE to a network of LECs (Fairley and Lloyd 1998). The function of LECs are to
co-ordinate the provision of the supply side of the economic infrastructure of their areas, addressing market
failure. They provide the delivery framework for the specific services associated with training, enterprise and
business development and environmental improvement. At a higher level, SE and HIE “provide strategic
policy guidance and expert advice to the LECs on individual economic sectors; undertake major projects or
research activities which extend beyond the areas of individual LECs; provide individual LECs with a range of
central support services which include administrative, accounting and property services; undertake marketing
and inward investment programs for the areas in question; undertake major environmental improvement
and land renewal programs, in consultation with the LECs involved; and monitor the progress of the LECs
in implementing their plans and achieving their objectives” (Fairley and Lloyd 1998). It should also be
noted that HIE has been given a social aspect to its developmental responsibilities, raising questions over the
potential imposition of an all-Scottish departmental approach to economic development. Such an approach
would be supported by a framework that categorizes the Highlands and Islands into different priority areas:
“fragile remote areas,” “areas of employment deficit,” “intermediate areas,” and “Inverness” and its hinterland.
Following the tendency for corporatist and consensus politics and policy institutions to be more acceptable in
Scotland, as argued earlier, these arrangements are clearly and distinctly Scottish and offer the potential for
securing an integrated development framework in each area. Before discussing whether any of the functions
of the RDAs should be centralized to the new Parliament (in particular the headquarters of SE and HIE)
or brought under the control of the local authorities (the LECs), two key dimensions need to be explored:
partnership and principle.
A key element to the operations of the LECs and the RDAs is that they work in partnership. This is especially
relevant in discussions over the future of the development agencies under a devolved Parliament. They are
not the “all singing, all dancing” monolithic multifunctional agencies envisaged in the early 1970s. SE and
HIE must work with other organizations, including local authorities, government departments, academia and
training bodies, the community and voluntary sectors, as well as the private sector, to develop and deliver
such things as skills training, business development and inward investment. This is important, but it is
also important that other organizations in turn recognize that the RDAs themselves bring a good deal of
experience and expertise to local and regional development strategies and programs. Whatever configuration
of powers and institutions is proposed, partnership will be an essential feature not only because it is rational to
share best practice and to realize synergies, but also because the European Commission insists that across the






• Integration and inclusion
In the assessments of the roles and performances of the RDAs in Scotland, a number of areas of criticism
have been raised over the years. It has been difficult to discern any scientific approach to an evaluation of
development agencies as such anywhere, though much has been written about their programs and strategies.31
31However see Chapter 1 of Halkier, Danson and Damborg 1998, for a discussion of this neglect.
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To make proposals on the future governance and functions of SE and HIE in this critical vacuum suggests
a need to return to first principles, and indeed an appreciation of the critical criteria against which the
mode of delivery of economic development policies should be measured. In proposing these principles, we are
calling upon a evolving field of literature that the Regional Studies Association, among other organizations,
has debated and addressed in recent years. The four principles, which are inevitably interrelated, are
accountability, sustainability, subsidiarity, and integration/inclusion.
That RDAs should be accountable is self-evident. Indeed this theme exercised the Scottish Affairs Committee
when it examined SE and HIE in 1995/6 and, despite the heat generated around this issue, there were but few
recommendations on improving democratic accountability. Others have thought otherwise; the Macfadden
Committee, for instance, argued for the powers of the LECs to be transferred to local authorities, though the
promised “bonfire of the QUANGOs” has not been as great an issue in Scotland as in Wales. What seems
clear from the experiences with the Scottish RDAs and others elsewhere (Hughes 1998) is that control over
the strategic long-term objectives and priorities of SE and HIE is necessary, but crucially there should not
be day-to-day interference in delivery mechanisms and projects. These latter should be assessed through
appropriate techniques and forms such as annual reports, monitoring frameworks, targets, and performance
criteria.
Much of the debate over the effectiveness of RDAs in the European Union and of economic development
agencies more generally across the world has concerned displacement. In other words, there is often a
belief that such agencies merely shift jobs and economic activity from urban areas in need of revitalization
to greenfield sites, and similarly from areas in need to other preferred locations. The trade-off between
the efficiency and the equity of policy regimes therefore impacts accountability. In the evaluations of the
“enterprise zone” experiment in the United Kingdom (where very specific locations were able to offer tax
breaks and other subsidies to mobile manufacturing plants), much was made of the need to demonstrate a
net benefit associated with local economic development efforts within the spatial context of the wider region.
The concern within the United Kingdom, and the European Union as a whole, over the promotion of the simple
redistribution of plants by local, regional and central government policies has led to a series of regulations and
controls over this aspect of policy intervention. These regulations appear to be in contrast with the United
States, where authorities are more able to invite investment and so to persuade companies to change their
location decisions. Within the United Kingdom there is a series of protocols over who can become involved in
the attraction of mobile investment. Only central government agencies can talk to potential new investors in
an area, and then only within tight guidelines. The range of inducements and assistance available to local
and regional development agencies is likewise strongly constrained by higher levels of governance. Above the
national controls lies the European Commission, which periodically sets the monetary and spatial limits and
types of policy instruments allowed for nations under the Commission. This regional policy environment is
far more constrained than are similar environments under the federal system of the United States.
Although certain states within the European Union have used tax incentives to attract firms, this form
of intervention works differently from how it works in the United States. In most cases in Europe, local
governments will not benefit directly from an increase in economic activity in their areas. Equalization grants
(Kellerman and Schmidt 1997) and unified local tax systems mean that local income and property taxes do
not follow firms from one local government jurisdication to another. This means that there is less benefit
in RDAs and other regional institutions involving themselves in the enticement of mobile plants. There
are, of course, other advantages in the attraction of firms, most noticeably employment generation and the
possibility of increased wealth creation for local companies through supply chains. In the United States, the
federal system allows local municipalities to benefit from an enhanced tax base in both payroll and property
terms, without having to subsidize firm relocation.
For development to be sustainable, it must involve the whole community and be accepted across all the
social partners - TUs, small and medium enterprises, community and voluntary sectors. Operationally there
are questions over the strategy of promoting a branch plant economy through inward investment at the
expense of long-term indigenous development (Ashcroft and Love 1996). There is a degree to which the new
dependencies created in the Scottish economy identified earlier are unsustainable and so unsuitable in the
Scottish context. On this criterion, the role of Locate in Scotland, the inward investment body for Scotland,
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would be called into question. A greater emphasis on clustering and networking is a potential change that
could be made in Locate in Scotland’s remit.
In the 1990s, subsidiarity was introduced into the evaluation of many policy areas. Following the approach
of Armstrong (1997), we define subsidiarity here as taking and delivering policies at the most appropriate
jurisdictional level. In other words, for certain functions the “local” level will be the most efficient level for
the development of such things as training policies, while for other functions it will be the regional or Scottish
levels. Training of software engineers would be more appropriately organized across the nation’s universities
rather than in the locality; there are important economies of scale and scope to be realized at all levels.
The benefits of a flexible yet strategic and objective approach can be considerable and will undoubtedly
occupy the boards of the development agencies and the committees of the Scottish Parliament; but these
deliberations could be at the expense of efficient operations on the ground.
Finally, integration and inclusion have become important themes for policies at the end of the millennium.
The need to maximize the value added by the Scottish economy and to capture the benefits of the higher
functions of national and global corporations operating here in any capacity suggests that greater attention
has to be paid to the linkages between plants, offices and services. The fixation of SE and other commentators
on the leading high-tech industries of today is in many ways as destructive as the focus of debate in the past
on steel, shipbuilding and coal. Thus traditional sectors such as textiles have suffered relative neglect because
of their image as a declining industry, compounding their inherent conservatism and under-capitalization
(Danson and Whittam 1998). The potential of such key areas of the Scottish economy is being dismissed in
current SE plans for clustering despite the successes abroad in turning around older staple sectors. Locate
in Scotland has tended to follow an implicit policy of promoting certain locations in Scotland (especially
New Towns, suburban and greenfield sites, latterly in enterprise zones in Lanarkshire) to maximize the
opportunities of attracting inward investment, regardless of the impacts on other markets - labor, training,
and property for instance - and of the damage it causes the remainder of the country. Old industrial and
rural areas, inner cities and peripheral estates have seen precious few manufacturing or service jobs directed
their way in the past twenty years, and they have received minimal consideration of their access to the
new industrial sites. This raises questions over the potential to enhance the role of structure plans in the
economic development process, and over the limitations on such power that is threatened by the multinational
agreement (MIA), being negotiated through the World Trade Organization. The agreement could restrict
the ability of the Scottish Parliament to impose greater controls over the supplying and sourcing policies of
inward investors.
The inclusion of SMEs in the development and the administration of economic policies has been a perennial
problem in the United Kingdom. With a weak Chamber of Commerce system and with a dual economy that
excludes most indigenous entrepreneurs from decision making within trade and employer associations, there
is a real need to ensure that the interests of the mass of locally owned concerns are heard in the LECs and
industry networks. Without a strong Scottish presence among the commanding heights of the economy and in
the leading sectors especially, there is a danger that plans for improved networking and clustering will fail.32
Much of the debate over integration has inevitably centered on the need to reduce social exclusion of the
long-term unemployed, women, the young and ethnic and peripheral communities. While initiatives, programs
and partnerships over the years have been established to address some dimensions of the lack of inclusion of
many in society, that the scale and depth of inequality has continued to increase is without doubt. Broadening
the remit of SE to encompass the social aspect of its developmental responsibilities, as HIE is charged to
undertake, would go some way toward meeting this division. However, a multi-agency, multi-annual, and
multifunctional approach will be necessary to overcome the obstacles to improved living standards for all
in Scotland. Partnerships between local authorities, LECs, Scottish Homes, employers, trade unions and
local communities are showing some promise of advancing the position of the excluded. Critically, LECs
cannot have an implicit slogan of “our business is business” if such progression is to become fundamental and
irreversible.
These principles suggest a need for the objectives, programs and actions of LECs, and others involved in
economic development, to be transparent, as the production and criticism of structure plans must be. Further,
32As discussed here and in Danson and Whittam 1998.
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linkages between sectors, enterprises, markets, locations and organizations can be key to the improvement
in the economy as a whole and to its parts. The Scottish Affairs Committee noted how crucial mandatory
consultation by LECs of local authorities could be, at least to secure greater legitimacy for the enterprise
networks in Scottish local governance and communities (Fairley and Lloyd 1988).
4.6 Evaluation and performance
As described in the introduction to this section, across the competing explanations of economic growth
and performance are certain common features. The creation and encouragement of specialized skills and
services, and the exploitation of research, technologies and innovation are considered to be critical drivers of
a successful strategy for regeneration. Mechanisms to ensure the commercialization of science and technology
from higher education and other institutions, the growth of new firms, the development of existing indigenous
enterprises, and the transfer of technologies and processes into the wider economy are recognized as areas
where market failure may demand significant intervention to secure advantages for the nation as a whole.
There has been relatively little analysis of the performance of development agencies since the merger of
the former agencies and the training agency in Scotland. Much attention has focused on their individual
programs and policies, and on issues of accountability. There have been calls for the boundaries of the LECs
in the SE network to be coterminous with those of local authorities or subregional groups of authorities,
all the more necessary given the abolition of the regional councils in 1996. Minor changes have been made
towards reducing some of the anomalies caused by the lack of congruence among these boundaries, but further
modifications could usefully be made to make the LECs’ jurisdictions closer to both local administrations
and local labor, industrial, and property markets and networks. Addressing the need for efficiency and
legitimacy, SE has recently been involving a broad range of organizations and partners in a wide ranging
and comprehensive review of its skills strategy. The full range of social partners has been consulted in this
ongoing process and perhaps illustrates the potential for local, regional and Scottish consensus under the
Scottish Parliament.
When the Scottish Affairs Committee proposed that this comprehensive skills strategy could be linked to
sectoral targets in partnership with industries (Fairley and Lloyd 1998), they were perhaps pointing to the
continuing need for such integration but using one of the characteristics of RDAs given above: their allowance
of public policies to be pursued “without evoking the ghosts of interventionism or state dirigisme” (Halkier and
Danson 1995, 1). Balancing this need to be acceptable to private enterprises with the need to be accountable
has been recognized as of major significance more generally in Scotland, according to a report on selected
members of the Scottish Council (SCDI 1997). Undoubtedly the desire to control QUANGOs and reduce the
democratic deficit are strong factors in support of the Scottish Parliament’s showing a closer concern with the
RDAs in Scotland, but without losing the advantages of the form of intervention that QUANGOs provide.
The efforts to be more inclusive with regard to the development of skills reflects concerns over the lack
of a central strategic overview of the problems of the Scottish economy and the problems of coordination
described above. In other markets, such as land, continuing and expanding calls for reform lend evidence
to the criticism that the RDAs have failed to change the culture of business and economic players. This
stands alongside criticisms that their existing policies have been inappropriate with regard to such matters as
employment creation and business starts.
Although employers in Scotland continue to be reluctant to meet the cost of training in modern times (Danson
et al. 1990), there remains a strong economic argument in favor of employers being obliged to invest in training.
Reconfirming a long-held commitment, the Scottish Trades Union Congress has argued that businesses should
be required to fund a training program equivalent to 0.5 per cent of payroll costs (Scottish Trades Union
Congress 1992). Meeting the training needs of a competitive economy suggests intervention in the market far
beyond the proposed minimum wage and the maintenance of a flexible labor force. Reincorporating the trade
unions and invigorating the employers’ involvement will be two of the principal priorities facing the Scottish
Parliament; given their restricted powers, the RDAs may prove the most efficient mode of intervention in the
labor market.
In the literature on industrial clusters, networking and learning communities, the issues of technology policy,
innovation, new firm formation and the ownership of industry are all closely connected and provide prime
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examples of the way in which the Scottish Parliament could in the long-term increase the dynamic efficiency
of the Scottish economy (Danson, Lloyd and Newlands 1990; Newlands 1997). Yet there has been an
undercurrent of concern over the feedback among these issues, and in particular over the implications of a
reliance on foreign direct investment for the promotion of indigenous growth. A major concern of the Scottish
Office and SE (and of their joint agency Locate in Scotland) has been the regeneration and diversification of
the Scottish economy through the attraction of plants owned by corporations outside the United Kingdom,
and especially corporations in the United States and the Pacific Rim countries. Much evaluation and analysis
of the operations of the Scottish development agencies has focused on the effects of this attraction of inward
investment to Scotland. It has been noted above that Scotland has become dependent for much of its
dynamism on the overseas owned electronics industry, with all that entails for control over the economy and
the potential for indigenous development. Recent indications are that these restraints should be addressed
by seeking to locate major R&D plants here to embed these leading sectors into the Scottish industrial
environment. This would certainly build on the comparative advantages of the economy, not the least of
which are the high level of skills and the research facilities and traditions of the educational system.
However, whether a real Scottish presence in the new technologies - and beyond just the electronics sector -
can be established without significant venture capital investment is doubtful. Well established arguments
for a Scottish industrial investment bank are returning to discussions on the Scottish economy. While the
financial sector in Scotland is significant in global terms, it remains less than effective in the provision of
funds for indigenous enterprises. Dow (1997) especially has argued for the closer involvement of the Scottish
banking sector in the Scottish economy, to address some of the limitations of the underdeveloped industrial
structure and to redress past neglects. Without the industrial banks of such competitors as the German
länder, the Scottish Parliament will have to be innovative in its use of indigenous resources; the land that
invented investment and unit trusts should be able to mobilize such funds more effectively than at present.
Many believed that the establishment of the Scottish Development Agency in 1975 would create such a
financial vehicle; it took several years to conclude that its attention was focused elsewhere - primarily on
being Europe’s largest industrial landlord.
Concerns over the role of Locate in Scotland and of inward investment (Standing Commission on the Scottish
Economy 1989, 47), despite the benefits of introducing new technologies, investments and management
skills to Scotland, have focused on the deepening of the branch plant syndrome. Because most product and
process innovations are developed in the plant in which they are first designed, and because there is little
interregional transfer of such innovations, Scotland’s low rates of new firm formation and innovation, and
its under-representation in high technology growth sectors, is understandable. Employees at branch plants
do not acquire the skills, business contacts or ideas to enable them to set up their own firms or mount a
management buy out.
As Newlands (1997) argues, the Scottish Parliament could promote “a shift in the priority given to the
attraction of inward investment and in the issues raised in Locate in Scotland’s discussions with potential
inward investors.” Reflecting Dow’s arguments, he suggests that stronger commitments could and should
be sought on such issues as the location of higher corporate and research functions, technology transfer,
and corporate recruitment, sales and purchasing policies. The Scottish Parliament might also pursue the
suggestion that the Scottish public sector and financial institutions combine to establish a “White Knight”
fund to strengthen existing Scottish businesses and enable those wishing to maintain their independence to
resist external takeover (Standing Commission on the Scottish Economy 1989).
Without necessarily raising public expenditure and within the powers granted to the devolved Parliament,
efforts could be made to strengthen cooperative networks further, and with them the culture and behavior of
enterprises and people in Scotland. This would reflect both the economic underpinnings of clustering and the
role political institutions can play in shaping economic performance more effectively by influencing the rules
and norms of behavior (Hodgson 1989; North 1994).
4.7 Partnerships and Europe
The rationale for the establishment of RDAs as argued by researchers such as Danson, Lloyd and Newlands
(1993) and Halkier and Danson (1997) is based on the idea that they are not only “the ‘manageable’ bottom
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up alternative, avoiding the bewildering maze of local initiatives” but they also allow “for flexibility and
receptiveness to the specific problems of indigenous industry within the region” (Halkier and Danson 1995,
1). Consequently, as has been noted, “a position outside the mainstream government apparatus appears to
make it possible to pursue public policies without evoking the ghosts of interventionism or state dirigisme,
and so to make it easier to adopt a long-term perspective, while the distance from government frequently
generates an operating environment more closely attuned to the needs of enterprise” (Halkier and Danson
1995, 1, emphasis added). In other words, the perceived advantages of RDAs as a form of regional policy
delivery institution could well be compromised by increasing moves to strong control over the day-to-day
operations by a parliament. Similarly, whether the costs of closer involvement of the RDAs in partnerships
and formal networks under both national and European Union programs would be worth bearing will depend
on the benefits realized and the synergies released by these alternative models of economic development.
4.8 Conclusion
With restricted powers and a hostile and limiting European and global economic environment, the Scottish
Parliament will face a need to balance aspirations against its capabilities. It will need and have a powerful
desire “to do something” in economic development and do so more directly than institutions do at present,
although Newlands (1997) has maintained that the growth function and the efficiency of intervention is
significant already. There will be a strong temptation to reabsorb SE especially, and perhaps HIE, back into
government, with some pressure to devolve the powers of the LECs to local authorities.
Given the rationale for RDAs and on the basis of the principles adopted here as applied to this form of
intervention, we would argue that such moves should be resisted. There is a need for improved democratic
control at all levels, and of better accountability of the strategic functions of the agencies particularly. It is
a source of worry, therefore, that the Labour government has failed to legislate for the statutory inclusion
of local authorities, trade unions and the community on the boards of LECs, European partnerships and
equivalent institutions.
We would also not support the transfer of the powers of the LECs to the local authorities. After reorganization,
many LECs are too small to deliver business and training services effectively and efficiently, while consortia or
joint boards appear to be a second-best solution. Experiments in partnership, such as the Ayrshire Economic
Forum, the Ayrshire Engineering Group and the networking of the HIE Community Land Unit, illustrate
the advantages of improvements to cooperation and trust across the economic landscape of Scotland. In
many fields, especially business services and certain types of manufacturing, the agglomeration economies
enjoyed by the metropolitan regions such as Barcelona, Frankfurt and Milan point to the need for a higher
rank of development agency operating at least at the Scottish level. Calls for more revolutionary reforms
threaten to be a distraction in the short term. Continuity and confidence will be fundamental to fulfilling
longer-term objectives, especially at a time of devolution to the new Scottish Parliament, compensatory
changes in England, European Union enlargement and reductions in Structural Fund support. The experience
of successful regions elsewhere in Europe provides evidence that an evolution of the Scottish model of
partnership is desirable, if the advantages of this tested approach are applied to economic links as well as to
institutional relationships. Maintaining this model will involve the Scottish Parliament in radical intervention
in the Scottish economy, especially if it incorporates the principles of accountability, sustainability, subsidiarity
and inclusion into its activities. Anything else will appear to be mere posturing.
The experiences of the RDAs in Scotland have been examined under the current regime and under the new
Parliament for two particular reasons. First, the Scottish agencies are the models for many of the development
institutions across Europe and beyond. Scotland’s extended history of economic problems has meant it has
been at the forefront in the establishment of and experimentation with many such initiatives.33 Scotland’s
experiences in the area can be seen as a good indication of the likely impacts of the moves to more catalytic
and coordinating institutions. Second, and leading from this, the move toward greater autonomy for Scotland
will allow a better analysis of the implications of securing control over differing forms of regional governance
structures in a way that is not being proposed for the English regions.
33See Morison, 198*, and McCrone, 196*, for comprehensive accounts of these developments.
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Critically, though, the institutional arrangements in other parts of the world, especially the United States,
are significantly different. In the United States, local municipalities may enhance payroll and property tax
revenues by intervening in the location decisions of firms, and there are much looser controls over the policy
instruments of their economic development agencies. This contrast in governance structures and policies can
have profound implications for the effectiveness of regional economic interventions. It suggests that attention
has to be paid to aspects of the regional economic environment other than cost and physical location factors.
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5 Clustering, Innovations and Trust: The Essentials of a Cluster-
ing Strategy
5.1 Introduction
Many areas around the developed world are adopting the clusters approach to regional economic regeneration,
with the United Kingdom-wide government Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) suggesting that this
could be a key element in re-establishing the competitiveness of national businesses in the future.28 As we
demonstrate throughout this section, many of the regional initiatives in the United Kingdom and indeed in
Europe, have originated in Scotland. There has been explicit reference to the Scottish approach to clusters in
a recent DTI report. In this section we examine how Scottish Enterprise (SE), the development agency for
Scotland, has recently launched a “clusters approach” for its key industrial sectors, arguing that if regions
and nations are to be competitive in the next century they must be at the forefront of knowledge production.
In order to compete, SE readily acknowledges that the information and ideas created and developed through
clustering are reliant on strong partnerships and that if synergy is to be maximized then the whole process of
the knowledge-based economy is dependent upon “working to build trust and a shared vision” (SE 1988a,
1). The envisaged strong partnerships will ideally consist of customers, suppliers, competitors, universities,
colleges, research bodies and utilities; in other words, they will be a private/public sector mix. This is
hardly surprising given the nature of the output produced, namely information, and the notoriety of the
private sector for underinvesting in research and development. This underinvestment occurs because of the
large element of fixed cost associated with the development of a new product or process, the inability of
the innovator necessarily to reap the benefit of the innovation, and the uncertainty attached to whether a
new product or innovation is to be successful. Given that knowledge production creates spillovers, and that
much of the knowledge produced is tacit, and further, that new products and processes will benefit from
critical commentary from all the players involved in a partnership, there is a spatial element attached to the
idea of achieving a competitive advantage through the establishment of a “learning economy” within the
globalized economy. The spatial dimension can be at a regional or a national level or indeed can transcend
state/regional boundaries. Much of this is readily accepted within the existing literature and is acknowledged
within part 5.2.
Of equal importance to the creation of new products and processes is the ability for members of a cluster
to communicate efficiently. Because learning economies consist of partnerships, the ability for efficient
communication between the members of a cluster is essential. Efficient communication will be assisted if
the partners within a cluster can trust one another so that fears of one member appropriating the new
idea or innovation can be reduced. The adoption of an appropriate institutional framework would greatly
facilitate communication. This is recognized within the current literature on learning economies, but the
nature of trust and cooperation is rarely discussed within this context. The ideas of trust and cooperation,
however, are acknowledged to be the key to the success of some of the most well known regional economies
of recent times, the industrial districts of the Third Italy being an example. We believe that if a regional
development institution is to be successful with a clustering strategy, the nature of trust and cooperation
within a partnership framework needs to be fully understood. We focus on the need for trust and cooperation,
therefore, along with some brief commentary regarding the role of trust and cooperation within the industrial
districts of the Third Italy in section six.
Within the European economies, there already exist examples of partnership frameworks that could be adopted
to assist the success of individual regional clustering strategies. The most successful of these partnership
institutions is the Strathclyde European Partnership (SEP). The SEP has received widespread acclaim
(Danson et al. 1997) as a model for bringing together the key players - both public and private - for the
delivery of regional economic development. In this section we examine the evolving partnership governance
structures within Scotland at a regional and county level, highlighting both good and bad practice. We then
conclude with policy implications and warning signs for the development of a clustering strategy based on
the learning economy within Scotland.
28This initiative is discussed further in section 8
35
5.2 Innovation and Learning
In its desire to establish a clustering strategy, SE is acknowledging the long-held view that European firms
and industries are losing their competitive advantage in the main to the United States and Japan (CEC 1993).
This loss is attributed in part to the lack of innovation within the European Union: “Among the factors
having a major impact on the competitiveness of the Community economy, Member States point particularly
to the following[:] ...inadequate assimilation of new technologies combined with failure to exploit properly the
results of research and technological development, leading to difficulties in concentrating the production of
goods and services in leading-edge and high value-added industries” (CEC 1993, 72). Yet conversely within
the European Union, certain regional economies have been successful in terms of the usual economic indicators
such as job creation and GDP growth. The reasons for success within these regions is partially attributed to
the ability to be innovative. The role of knowledge and the innovation process has been identified by economic
growth theorists as being a significant factor in endogenous growth theory and in accounting for the Solow
residual (Boltho and Holtham 1992; van der Ploeg and Tang 1992; Scott 1992). The key component of the
innovative process is the creation of knowledge, a point recognized by theorists and practitioners alike (see,
for example, Gregersen and Johnson 1997; CEC 1993). The recognition of this point has focused attention on
how firms, regions and indeed nations innovate. In researching this phenomenon, regional scientists have
utilized the methodology of the evolutionary economists Gregersen and Johnson (1997), Morgan (1997),
Grabher and Stark (1997), Storper and Scott (1995), Storper (1992 and 1995) and Lundvall and Johnson
(1994). A major contribution to the discovery and utilization of knowledge is attributable to the institutional
framework that evolves to facilitate the process. Institutions in this sense include both formal and informal
organizations. Formal organizations include RDAs. An informal organization can be defined as “a social
organisation which, through the operation of tradition, custom or legal constraint, tends to create durable and
routinised patterns of behaviour” (Hodgson 1988, 10). The emphasis from the regional science perspective
is that due to the nature of knowledge - much of it being tacit, it is not easily transferable - the system or
region that creates it will develop the advantages associated with innovation.
Storper (1995) highlights the importance of what he describes as “untraded interdependencies” to firms’ use of
knowledge. For Storper the interdependency arises because of the way technology is developed. Utilizing the
evolutionary approach, he focuses on the path dependency nature of technological development. “Technologies,
for one thing, are subject to a variety of user-producer and user-user interactions” (Storper 1995, 204). Where
clustering occurs because of some commonality of technological development, “untraded interdependencies”
arise, such as common coded language, norms, customs and practices. These common institutions lead to
easier communication and facilitate trust and cooperation. Similarly, Freeman comments “Firms learn both
from their own experience of design, development, production and marketing and from a wide variety of
external sources at home and abroad - their customers, their suppliers, their contractors...and from many
other organisations - universities, government laboratories and agencies, consultants, licensors, licensees and
others” (Freeman 1994, 470). This list is not unlike those institutions identified by SE as making up a typical
cluster: companies, customers, suppliers, utilities, research institutes, education (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1
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Although original ideas may be learned from sources beyond their specific localities, their implementation and
innovation can be achieved most efficiently within an area with sympathetic institutions, that is, an area where
“untraded interdependencies” have developed. Gregersen and Johnson (1997) make a distinction between “the
production of knowledge and the utilization of knowledge”. What is significant for Gregersen and Johnson
is that “learning has become increasingly endogenous. Learning processes have been institutionalized and
feed-back loops for knowledge accumulation have been built in, so that the economy as a whole is learning by
interacting in relation to both production and consumption. When economies learn how to learn the process
tends to accelerate” (Gregersen and Johnson 1997, 481). This would be the ultimate aim of a clustering
strategy based on the learning process: the acquisition of new knowledge and the processing of the new
knowledge into innovative methods of production resulting in new learning for all the participants in the
cluster.
Surprisingly, as we mentioned in part 2.2, many of the regional scientists already cited fail to identify the
locational aspects of learning regions with the earlier studies of Marshallian industrial districts, Storper
(1992) being a notable exception. Implicit in this discussion is the idea that there is an ongoing interaction
between the key players in a spatially specific area, including what Marshall would call an industrial district.
Marshall provides a useful summary of the learning process that is analyzed by Gregersen and Johnson (1997,
481) and Lundvall and Johnson (1994, 26). In addition to the usual list of agglomeration economies and
external economies of scale that are gained through organizing production within spatially defined areas, we
have seen that learning economies also develop norms and practices that enable the key players to interact
in an efficient manner: “The idea that lies at the centre of he concept of innovation systems is that the
overall innovative performance of an economy depends not only on how specific organizations like firms and
research institutes perform, but also on how they interact with each other and with the government sector in
knowledge production and distribution” (Gregersen and Johnson 1997, 482). In a similar vein Lundvall and
Johnson comment “knowing how to do things in isolation is not the decisive type of knowledge any more.
Knowing how to communicate and cooperate becomes much more important than before” (Lundvall and
Johnson 1994, 25). Storper (1995) notes that all production systems involve uncertainty and that “The main
way that such uncertainty is resolved is through conventions, which are taken-for-granted rules and routines
between the partners...” (Storper 1995, 208). The most important of these conventions, we would argue, are
trust and cooperation. Although theorists of the learning economies identify the need for communication, and
although the method to produce efficient communication (establishing conventions of trust and cooperation)
is acknowledged, the nature of trust and cooperation is not widely discussed. The issues surrounding the
establishment of trust and cooperation are examined in section 6. For the remainder of section 5 we will
examine the development of clustering within the Scottish economy.
5.3 The Development of Clustering Within Scotland
It has been claimed that Scotland has given the European Union the model approach to regional economic
development, with its strategic partnerships of central and local government, RDAs, QUANGOs, and
other players in the public, private and voluntary sectors (Danson et al. 1997). These partnerships have
been established over the last twenty years, especially in West Central Scotland, through the progressive
development of multi-agency, multi-annual, multifunctional initiatives, task forces and area agreements
(Randall 1987; Moore and Booth 1986). While there have been criticisms of individual partnerships (Boyle
1989; Collins and Lister 1996), their durability and transnational acceptance have been testament to the
perceived effectiveness and success of these forms of comprehensive intervention in the regeneration and
redevelopment of communities.
Labour Party-dominated local authorities, such as Strathclyde Regional Council and Glasgow District Council,
have been able to work closely on a common agenda with the market oriented Scottish Development Agency
(Danson et al. 1980), and the private corporation-based Enterprise Trust movement (albeit their sponsorship
was predominantly derived from the public purse). Their work, which has involved a series of partnerships at
the local and subregional levels, suggests the building of trust through cooperation and experience. This has
been critical in producing a model of intervention which is now adopted across the European Union.
The advantages of such partnership working can be discerned in the move toward a cluster approach to
regional economic development within Scotland. It is becoming accepted at the national and regional levels
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that partnerships are not only a legitimate and effective way of coordinating and focusing the resources
of a number of agencies onto a problem, but also the favored approach. Local further education colleges,
housing agencies, health boards and others have joined mainstream economic development bodies in stressing
the need to work in formal partnerships with each other to meet economic and social challenges, as well as
in their commitment to participate in these formal arrangements. The clusters strategy stresses the need
to position Scotland at the high value end of the market, with enterprises active in the cluster operating
within “a local economic environment geared to innovation, investment and upgrading” (SE 1998, 4). The
strategy will be advanced by flexible partnerships of public and private sectors, which will include industry,
education and government. These partnerships will devise action plans around which all economic players
will cluster to promote an integrated development policy. Integration will be extended to the critical issues
identified elsewhere by SE: “the need to capitalise better on Scottish scientific and technological expertise; to
help companies build up their research, design and development capacities; to stimulate entrepreneurship;
to encourage companies’ international ambitions and to build a high-performance transport infrastructure”
(SE, 1998, 4) [for how to define clusters see Bergman and Feser, Chapter 3, “Cluster Morphology of Regions:
Analytic Options.”]




The strategy is to be underpinned by these other objectives and agencies, therefore. It will be holistic,
acting upon synergies and linkages. The clusters will include both indigenous and inward investment. The
strategy stresses technology, innovation and sustainable economic growth and development, suggesting the
transmogrification of SE back into the RDA envisioned in the 1970s, rather than the business agency it has
become over the last few years (Danson et al. 1980). This approach is being applied in many geographical
and functional contexts, with reliance on a single agency forsaken in all areas of (re)development. Although
clustering is usually applied to industrial organization, the concepts on which it is built can be found in
other forms of governance structures, namely partnerships. In the remainder of this section we examine an
attempt to promote the clustering strategy in one industry in Scotland, namely the electronics industry,
and then analyze how the concepts that lie at the center of networking and clustering can be found in one
particular area in Scotland, Ayrshire. These two case studies will highlight the contrast between differing
governance structures. One consists of a trans-public agency partnership, built on trust and cooperation
established over many years. The other comes from the emerging clusters approach to industrial regeneration
and development. It is based on a model promoted by SE but does not seem to reflect recognition of the full
implications of the philosophical underpinnings of the industrial district.
5.4 Implementing the Clustering Strategy
Scottish Enterprise has identified the electronics sector as a key industry in Scotland, which is hardly surprising
given the importance of the sector to the Scottish economy. There are problems fully embedding the sector
in the local economy, and SE is aware of them. Clarke (1996), in his study of the Scottish software industry,
reported on a sector that displays many of the characteristics of a high technology sector, requiring particular
forms of support within a general program of assistance. Although sector-specific programs are seen positively,
Clarke questioned the concentration of state business development agencies on a minority of export-oriented,
product-based companies. In like manner, Turok (1993a) examined the development of the printed circuits
industry in Scotland. Unlike much of the electronics sector here, it is dominated by indigenous enterprises
that are growing strongly. He argued that the main reasons for this buoyancy are the local concentration
of firms within Scotland, the avoidance of direct competition between companies, the particular demand
conditions facing the sector - based as they are on batch production of customized products for technically
close customers, and the need to satisfy just-in-time manufacturing processes. Turok recommended closer
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connections between enterprises and so the “growth of a Scottish industrial cluster in electronics,” as the
sector tends to supply original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in a dedicated chain with few external
economies obvious from enhanced linkages between companies. It is not clear, however, how agglomeration
economies would be promoted through improved networking and why, by extension, the industry would
support such moves.
In line with the clustering strategy, SE is attempting to encourage more local sourcing through a Strategic
Alliance with the major electronics firms who are organized through the Scottish Electronics Forum. The
objective is to provide “vital support and infrastructure” (SE 1998a) so that the industry can maintain its
competitive edge. This is to be achieved by making sure that the electronics industry exploits developing
markets by concentrating on more knowledge-intensive activities, enabling the development of a “value-added
logistics hub.” The Alliance identifies four ways to achieve this aim: commercializing academic and industrial
research, increasing the level of Scottish content in electronics products, developing the skills base of the
Scottish work force, and attracting R&D investment into Scottish plants (SE 1998b). The Alliance has now
been adapted to fall in line with the clustering strategy of SE. This has resulted in a group of singularly
functional operational departments combining to form the Information Industries Group. The information
industries clusters team has a dominant role in working closely with the Electronics, Optoelectronics, Software,
Multimedia and Information Society partners. The problems facing this cluster in the electronics industry
concern job creation, local sourcing and technology transfer. “The Scottish electronics sector’s total output
has nearly doubled in the past decade. But total direct employment today, despite some growth in the late
1980s is roughly where it was in the mid 1980s.... Nearly 80% of all components and sub-assemblies which go
into Scottish-produced electronics output is sourced outwith Scotland” (Young 1997, 14).
In a study of linkages within the electronics industry in Scotland, Turok (1993b) suggested that there are
opportunities for much higher levels of local sourcing by the foreign owned original equipment manufacturers
(OEMs). Even where these do exist, he described them as corresponding to a “dependency model” rather
than to a “self-sustaining economic development scenario.” Linkages are seen as weak or based on dependency,
therefore the industry is not embedded into the regional economy. With few high technology linkages between
indigenous supplier and OEM, there are no effective clusters because connections are founded on market
strengths, not trust and cooperation. Few cases of transfers of staff or technologies have been recorded.
Classically, the retention of higher order functions (R&D, marketing, strategic management, financing)
elsewhere limits the ability of the local economy to establish business services externally to the multinational
enterprises themselves, and to furnish spin-offs, transfers, and the other components of a successful milieu.
5.5 Local Economy Regeneration Partnerships
In Ayrshire, through an initiative which is being replicated across lowland Scotland, the local enterprise
company Enterprise Ayrshire (the locally managed government agency established to coordinate the delivery
of training and business development services and infrastructure), the three local authorities (East, North
and South Ayrshire Councils), the Ayrshire Chamber of Commerce, the government housing agency Scottish
Homes, the trade unions through the Scottish Trades Union Congress, and SE have come together as Ayrshire
Economic Forum to prepare a collective Ayrshire Economic Development Strategy. Over the last year, the
Forum has discussed the issues facing the county in the next half century to produce a Consultative Document
“A Vision for Ayrshire” (Ayrshire Economic Forum 1998). This has been used to include the whole community
in a period of reflection and debate over the future development of the area. This “Challenge for the 21st
Century” repeatedly stresses the need for partnership, cooperation and cohesion with a recognition of “our
identity,” “our collective voice,” “our common cause,” “our Vision” and “community.”
Such phraseology and sentiment are supported by independent reviews of the local economy and local market.
The report “Labour Market and Skills Trends in Ayrshire” claims to be “tangible evidence of the commitment
to a partnership approach to identifying and addressing economic issues in Ayrshire” (Ayrshire Economic
Forum 1998, 3), with again use of self-containment in the county labor market, integration and “a strong
partnership amongst local agencies” promoted as evidence of a cohesive economic community. Social inclusion
runs through the policy recommendations subsequent to the report and on into the plans and philosophies of
the other agencies separately.
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Thus, Scottish Homes in the region promises that “the majority of our [future] investment ... delivers against
existing multi-agency commitments, with specific initiatives already identified and being prepared with
partners” (Scottish Homes South & West 1998, 29). In a similar vein, South Ayrshire’s strategy document
“2020 Vision” is built on the idea of partnership and cooperation with the other agencies operating in the area,
and beyond. Joint campaigns in favor of infrastructure improvements (extension of the motorway system into
the county) and in response to economic challenges (redundancies and closures) are strengthening. Within
council areas, at a lower level of community, the former government’s programs for “Priority Partnership
Areas,” “Regeneration Areas” and “Smaller Urban Renewal Initiatives” are continuing to attract the support
of a range of organizations and demonstrate a significant degree of cooperation to deliver synergies and
effective performances in economic development delivery.
At a higher scale, the members of the Ayrshire Economic Forum are cooperating to secure enhanced levels
of inward investment, European Union funds and central government resources. These initiatives illustrate
a maturing of the partnership approach established under the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and
Strathclyde Regional Council in the 1970s, and nurtured over the intervening years. It is notable that they
are still present after the dislocations precipitated by the creation of the local enterprise company network
(as part of SE, to replace the SDA) in 1991 and the reorganization of local government in 1996. The trust
secured and developed between organizations, and critically between the personnel of the successor bodies to
the former SDA, District and Regional Councils, allows cooperation and partnership to survive and to be
deepened in this environment.
By way of contrast with these developments, the recently promoted cluster approach in Scotland has shown
less promise. Part 5.6 assesses the form and likely success of this approach to the economic development
problems facing the Ayrshire economy.
5.6 The Clusters Approach at the County Level
In a development of the traditional industrial concept, the SE cluster approach calls on companies to establish
strong partnerships to build trust and a shared vision. These specialist networks or clusters will “fuel
innovation and generate synergies” that will enhance their international competitiveness. These clusters will
“mean encouraging competition, co-operation and strong networks right across the community and between
the public and private sectors” (SE 1998a, 1). The rhetoric, therefore, is very similar to the regional economic
development partnership model described above.
Part 5.6 is not intended as a complete assessment of this sectoral reorientation of the SE economic strategy
(see Botham (1997 unpublished) for an analysis). Rather, it is an analysis of those key components of
“Scotland’s Cluster Development Approach” that illustrate the connectivity between the theory and practice.
The accompanying diagram (Figure 5.1), taken from the SE strategy document, suggests a coherent, inclusive
partnership of all relevant development organizations. The approach focuses on “some of Scotland’s most
important value-creating clusters”: food, biotechnology, software, electronics, optoelectronics, and multimedia.
Leaving to one side the geographical distribution of these sectors (most are under- or unrepresented in
Ayrshire, for instance) and the dependence on foreign domiciled multinational corporations, one may see a
number of divergences between the strategic approach as seen by SE headquarters and the attempts to create
clusters more locally.
Within Ayrshire, traditionally two of the most significant sectors in terms of employment and gross value
added have been textiles and engineering. Although both have a long history in the county, they have also
seen major periods of restructuring, with new firms and products entering the economy locally and well
established enterprises disappearing. Past forecasts for these sectors and an assessment of their respective
prospects led to the creation of formal networking arrangements under two initiatives: the Ayrshire Textile
Group (ATG) and the Ayrshire Engineering Group.
As is noticeable elsewhere in Europe, but especially in the United Kingdom, the clothing and textile
industry has been considered a “sunset industry” since at least the late 1970s (Totterdill 1992, 22). Structural
adjustments in Scandinavia, Germany and northern Italy to changing patterns of consumer tastes, competition
from non-European countries and trading agreements prompted a reconsideration of the future for the industry
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in Scotland, and in Ayrshire in particular. Research suggested that the industry’s successful adaptation to
these changes would require:
• Intensive market intelligence linked to continuous design innovation
• High levels of technical expertise, particularly in production planning and problem solving
• A highly versatile system of production
• Effective use of distribution networks (Totterdill 1992, 24)
The idiosyncrasies of the United Kingdom’s relations with Europe are mirrored here in the response to the
successful restructuring strategies adopted in the other areas of the European Union. Evidence from the
regionally important Nottinghamshire sector in England shows a range of local responses, some positive others
less so. The need for intervention and the appropriateness of the above conditions pointed to the advantages
of the establishment of an equivalent partnership or network in Ayrshire. Totterdill, at least, was arguing
generally for a model close to the Emilia Romagna policy in the Third Italy for such areas, representing a
complex, multilayered and decentralized model of partnership (1992, 47). The plans for Ayrshire supported
such an initiative.
However, problems in the development of the model locally illustrate the failure to achieve a positive
restructuring of the industry, despite the creation of a partnership, because of the lack of understanding of
the need to promote cooperation and trust (Danson and Whittam 1998). As argued below, this requires a
degree of ownership by the constituent firms.
SE identified textiles as an industry in which clustering should be encouraged so that the industry can
compete. At the local level Enterprise Ayrshire has been instrumental in trying to implement this policy
via the ATG. The textile industry in Ayrshire now represents 25% of Ayrshire’s manufacturing industry,
employing 9000 people and exporting £60 million per annum. In 1991 a partnership arrangement between
Enterprise Ayrshire and the textile sector was established. This led to the creation of the ATG in 1992
with the establishment of a program of assistance leading to the ATG acquiring its own premises in 1994.
The commitment to working in partnership with the industry reflects the ethos of Enterprise Ayrshire’s
approach to local economic development: “it seeks to develop and build relationships with companies rather
than superimposing a structure onto a sector” (ATG 1994, 3). The ATG appears initially to have been
successful in the “delivery of information advice and programs in response to proven needs ... with more
than 60% of local industry participating in some meaningful way” (ATG 1994, 4). This has led to product
development, moving products more up-market, increased diversification and marketing Ayrshire textiles as
a group. However, there has been a failure to take the project forward to develop a “stand alone resource
centre.” To become “free standing,” it is envisaged that the ATG must recover all its operating costs. In
this context, Johnstone and McLachlan (1996) found textile companies reluctant to participate fully in the
network. This lack of participation became an obstacle to realizing economies of scale and scope, with “a low
level of trust and the strongly adversarial nature of the [local] sector” (755) a significant factor. Unwillingness
to pool resources, concern over allocation of orders within the network, apprehension over cooperation, and
a failure to communicate were all cited as contributory reasons for the lack of a full commitment to the
project by the member firms. The need for training in networking protocol and processes, the key role of
the facilitator, and the benefits of contractual agreements between members were identified as necessary
elements if the local industry was to create a successful cluster. It would appear that although ATG has
attempted to develop a partnership, the companies do not see the group as theirs. There is a tacit recognition
of this problem in one of the reasons given for the establishment of the “free standing” facility: “The Ayrshire
Textile Industry must view the ATG and its Resource Centre as their own” (ATG 1994, 13). This is one of
the essential features of the ‘ideal model’ of the Strathclyde European Partnership.
Further, few companies were willing to pay for the services of the ATG, and where funds were provided
for marketing, training and product development it was difficult to persuade the firms to follow the ATG’s
requirement to quantify “outcomes.” Other problems also became apparent. For example, in the local
lace sector, which produces some unique products and occupies significant niche markets, there was a
strong reluctance to pass on skills, experience and expertise to younger recruits. This will have inevitable
consequences for the industry in Ayrshire. However, a limited number of innovative enterprises recognized
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the partnership as beneficial; these companies tended to support joint seminars, the use of CAD/CAM, the
potential of linkages with tourism, and technology transfer initiatives.
Another attempt by an LEC to deliver SE’s clustering objective can be found in Ayrshire: the Engineering
Ayrshire (EA) initiative. Engineering is the largest manufacturing sector in Ayrshire, with over 180 companies
employing over 14,000 people. It has a turnover of £1.9 billion and generates £1.3 billion in export sales (EA
1997, 6). The original rationale for the establishment of the group arose because of the perceived lack of sales
beyond the west of Scotland. To this end EA has organized trade missions, launched a public procurement
initiative and provided individual members with export sales and product/process improvement support. The
EA group is now seeking to widen its activities to capitalize on opportunities presented by changing market
conditions. Of significance and giving grounds for optimism, vis-à-vis the possibility of the group becoming
self-financing and realizing key objectives such as developing a skills base in a collective manner, is the
structure of the organization. Unlike the ATG, the aims of EA state that it should “be an organisation run
by its members for the benefit of its members and the Ayrshire engineering and electronics sector” (EA 1997,
9). Within its strategic objectives there is a responsibility placed on the membership to work in partnership
with the relevant organizations (such as Enterprise Ayrshire itself, local councils, and trade associations)
and to attend relevant seminars and programs. The group is managed by a steering committee, comprising
senior representatives from six companies and two Enterprise Ayrshire executives, which meets monthly.
A full members’ meeting is held at least once a year. By placing obligations and responsibilities onto the
membership and by having an accountable framework for decision making of the group as a whole, it is hoped
that the problems associated with the ATG in attempting to develop its strategy will be overcome. The
essentials of an ideal network, outlined in the introduction, can be seen in the EA clustering initiative.
5.7 Conclusion
The above demonstrates that a cluster strategy can be an effective instrument in the regeneration of a regional
economy. The synergies and mechanisms for resolving conflicts identified in the case study of the trans-public
sector agency partnerships in Scotland have been significant in the adoption of the “Scottish partnership
model” across the European Union. However, the lessons from this approach coupled with the theoretical
underpinnings in the literature on industrial districts have not been incorporated fully into the strategies for
industrial clusters. Trust and cooperation are essential if the advantages of innovation and networking are to
be realized by all of the players in a sector, and if clusters are to be effective. In the successful partnerships
described here, the long development of working relationships between organizations and between individuals
have been critical to formulating a successful approach to regional economic development. However, where
networks have been dominated by multinational enterprises or their structures and modi operandi have been
imposed from the center, there have been significant problems in the perception and appreciation of the
benefits of the new clusters, exemplified here by one of the case studies from Ayrshire. Without some sense
of ownership over their cluster and network, the SMEs that may have most to gain from the promotion of
industrial districts realistically will remain excluded from these partnership activities.
The issue of the distribution of power within the cluster can be critical, therefore, to its acceptance and
success. What guarantees are there that all the key players are going to play the game fairly? In other words,
how can the cluster ensure that a multinational corporation, which is not necessarily tied into a specific
locality because of the relative mobility of capital, is going to share advances in knowledge acquired through
the network?
As much of the output of knowledge is information, and given the public good aspect of information, these
concerns may be resolvable; evidence from Wales (Morgan 1997) suggests that this is the case. However,
given the recent processes of the economic development of the Scottish economy and the special relationship
with multinational corporations, these concerns may not always be resolved. As we have argued here, there is
a need to create a structure for clusters that meets the desires of regional SMEs, and that allows indigenous
companies to regain control over future development and to have a stake in the growth and evolution of the
industry.
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6 Networking and Industrial Districts: New Types of Industrial
Organization
6.1 Introduction
As noted in the sections above, in the recent past the academic literature and the policy strategies of many
developed countries have strongly favored the organization of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) through
“networking” structures and more spatially specific arrangements, namely industrial districts. This section
explores some of the conditions necessary for the establishment of formal organizational structures that
will lead to firms cooperating within the process of production. The terminology we employ to describe
interfirm relationships is deliberately loose but encompasses all types of relationships that embrace some
degree of risk-sharing and information exchange. The section centers on arrangements within the context of
the Scottish economy.
The section’s focus is based on the fact the principal agency with the task for economic management of the
Scottish economy, Scottish Enterprise (SE), has recently identified networking arrangements among SMEs as
a way to achieve growth and hence job creation among them. According to SE, “Networks are important:
many of the solutions will be found in the actions of individual entrepreneurs, backed by their networks of
family and friends. An important focus of action for the strategy is to improve the effectiveness of these
networks and to make potential entrepreneurs more aware of what they can do themselves to achieve success.
Part of this involves improving the support given by the formal support networks in the private and public
sectors” (SE 1993, 4). The Business Birth Rate Strategy acknowledges that there are problems with existing
networking agencies within the Scottish economy and seeks ways to encourage the effectiveness of both formal
and informal networking arrangements (SE 1993, 8). See Figure 6.1 :Company birth rate
Figure 6.1
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As SE’s research efforts and strategies were based on an examination and analysis of the international
literature and practices of various levels and forms of governance institutions, the work of SE is used here to
show an appropriate example of a standard region. The processes of research and strategy development are
applicable well beyond the Scottish experience, so we use this case study as a fully legitimate introduction to
the exploration of “networking.”
The objectives of the SE inquiry were to provide improved understanding of the role of new firm formation
(NFF) in economic development and to explain why Scotland had a lower rate of business creation than other
regional and national economies. These objectives made the inquiry international by definition. The SE
research program identified two key concepts: the Business Life Cycle and Segmentation. The former concept
gave rise to two key questions: Why does Scotland generate so few new ventures, and why does Scotland
generate so few new ventures that grow into substantial companies?
In addressing segmentation, the SE program addressed the varying rates of NFF across countries and regions
- by structure, product and process. It also analyzed entrepreneurs - by background and circumstances -
to investigate the operation of entrepreneurial development in different market milieu. Within this overall
framework the program analysed a number of key issues: regional new firm performance, individual and
sectoral case studies, business environment, and entrepreneurial potential and cultural issues.
The analysis confirmed the persistent low rates of enterprise creation in Scotland (Figure 6.2), although the
growth of surviving enterprises was at least as good in Scotland as elsewhere, if not superior. From this, SE
concluded that the problem was the overall birth rate, with the policy implication being that measures to
expand the pool were more appropriate than “picking winners.”
Figure 6.2
If the promotion of “networking arrangements” to achieve the desired objective of new firm formation is
to be successful, an understanding of the essential components of successful networking is needed. In this
section we focus on the issues of trust and cooperation. The remainder of the section is divided into four
parts. Part 6.2 provides a brief history of the Scottish economy, focusing on the significance of the past
for present-day policy proposals. The consideration of historical, social, political and other environmental
contexts in contemporary economic scientific analysis is typical of the Scottish Political Economy tradition.
Part 6.3 identifies the significance of trust and cooperation, highlighting how these critical factors can become
established. Part 6.4 analyses how successful SE has been in attempting to establish networking arrangements.
Part 6.5 concludes the section by suggesting policy implications in an attempt to ensure the future success of
networks within the economy. The economies arising out of organizing production within industrial districts
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have been highlighted elsewhere (Oughton and Whittam 1997) and are not a major concern of this paper.
6.2 Scotland: On the Periphery of Europe
.
Since the United Kingdom joined the European Union, the British Isles’s trade and industry have seen a
change of focus. In many ways this shift of focus has merely exacerbated a much longer decline in Scotland,
Wales and the north of England. Indeed, over “most of this century Scotland has been declining relative to
the rest of the United Kingdom and, by extension, the rest of Europe” (Danson 1991, 89). As one of the first
industrialized regions of Europe and of the world, Scotland has experienced both an early period of growth
and a long history of stagnation.
The growth and development of the economy was built on strong networks. According to Slaven, in the early
part of the twentieth century “A community of interests was growing among steelmakers and shipbuilders, and
this was a link more strongly developed at a later date.... The demands of the shipyards boosted the growth
of steel dictated the changing production patterns of the pig-iron and malleable-iron producers. Marine
engineering and shipbuilding lay at the centre of a complex concentration of heavy engineering and finishing
trades” (1975, 182).
Behind the development of the Scottish economy, and of Clydeside in particular, were also factors associated
with the British Empire. Britain’s role as an imperial power, based on naval supremacy, prompted the
establishment of the coal and steel industries of central Scotland. The regional economies, and through
linkages and migration the rest of the nation, became inextricably dependent on the trading and military
position of the United Kingdom as a whole. Clydeside experienced very significant growth in industry and
population in the years up to 1914. Records on shipbuilding tonnage (Slaven 1975) confirm that this area
was at the heart of the Empire in terms of industrial output and importance. World War I was perhaps
the watershed. Although the seeds of external destruction may have been made inherent before then, the
decline of British power and controlled imperial markets exposed a rapid and deep structural imbalance in
the Scottish economies. Massive unemployment, poverty, deprivation and emigration marked the period up
to the World War II, with Glasgow containing what may have been the worst urban slums in the history
of the planet (Damer 1990). Since 1930 this industrial legacy has left Scotland subject to a broad set of
economic policies targeted at relieving the worst effects of the rundown and closure of its staple industries -
steel, coal, shipbuilding, heavy engineering and textiles.
Having struggled to maintain former glories in output and trade through most of the century, Scotland -
and the rest of the periphery of Britain - has been in almost constant benefit of various forms of regional
development aid. Regional economic policies have been based on the restructuring of old industrial areas
and the decongestion of overcrowded housing and manufacturing areas. Increasingly, such policies have been
concerned with promoting foreign direct investment and withdrawing the state from direct involvement in
production. This has led to an increase in the degree of external control and ownership of Scottish industries.
The change has come at times through merger and takeover, through nationalization and privatization, and
through differential rates of decline and growth of native and foreign companies. Research suggests that
such changes, in complex ways, put a relative brake on the rates of new firm formation and indigenous
development (Ashcroft, Love and Schouller 1987). Concomitantly, output, trade and investment have become
more narrowly dependent on a few key sectors.
With the regional policy focus on the attraction of inward investment and with low rates of endogenous
growth, a branch plant economy has been created to replace the former heavy industrial clusters. With
few local supplier or purchaser linkages, and an absence of such higher business functions as R&D, finance,
marketing and corporate strategy, branch plants offer jobs to the local economy, but little else. In particular,
there are minimal relations established or developed between inward investors and the local SME sector.
Electronics (and computers especially) and whisky in Scotland have accounted for over half of non-oil
manufacturing exports (Scottish Council Development and Industry 1997), and about 50% of all manufacturing
investment in recent years. Both these sectors are dominated by overseas companies, with over 90% of output
by non-Scottish firms. Over a quarter of manufacturing employment in Scotland is in overseas-owned plants,
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and much of the rest is controlled by United Kingdom corporations with their headquarters in the southeast
of England. This degree of domination is often blamed, in a simple way, for the massive restructuring of the
Scottish economy since 1979.
Since 1980, 40% of all Scottish manufacturing jobs have been lost. In key traditional sectors such as coal,
steel and engineering the decline in employment has been heavy, with the replacement of some of these
jobs in electronic and electrical engineering. In many sectors such as agriculture, fishing, energy and water,
manufacturing and construction, employment is at its lowest levels in Scotland, with jobs for both men and
women disappearing. Only the service sector is showing any growth over time, and then only in part-time
work.
In such past-dominated, narrow economies, NFF and SMEs have been presented as panaceas in the mission
statements of many agencies in European regional economic development and regeneration programs. This is
noticeable in the European Union in particular. The business birth rate in the European Union has increased
since 1980 (SE 1996). However, questions have been raised over the ability of companies dependent on the
local market to reverse long-term regional decline on their own. Entering this debate, Malecki and Nijkamp
(1988), for example, have suggested that uneven development is endemic and that it is imposible to overcome
metropolitan core bias through compensation of the periphery. On the other hand, Vaessen and Keeble (1995)
appear to see enough examples of successful SMEs in the periphery to argue that regional divergence need
not be inevitable.
In practice, there has been but limited success in replacing traditional major manufacturing employers.
Seeing that more prosperous areas of the United Kingdom tend to maintain higher rates of business start-up
(Ashcroft and Love 1996) and that real unemployment rates are persistently significantly higher than the
United Kingdom average in the problem regions (Beatty and Fothergill 1997), one might conclude that
greater levels of incomes and wealth are compatible with the creation of conditions for enterprise development.
But analysis of the nature and form of networking and of the wider business environment is also of critical
relevance in determining such comparative performances in regeneration.
A key question for the success of the new firm and of inward investment strategies, separately and collectively,
is whether they are conducive to the creation of networking and industrial districts. Superficially based on
the best practice models identified in regional economic regeneration strategies elsewhere in Europe and in
North America, these strategies rely on trust and cooperation. It is to a consideration of these themes that
we now turn.
6.3 Trust and Cooperation in Industrial Districts
From the outset it is worth remembering that wherever exchange takes place, either on the market or through
firms, a degree of cooperation takes place. The division of labor, so crucial toThe Wealth of Nations, is
dependent on cooperation between the parties involved. Similarly, business deals involving millions of pounds
are concluded on the strength of a handshake, and currency deals struck over computer terminals are all
based on a degree of trust. Looking at events in the natural world, perhaps we should not be so surprised at
the potential for cooperative behavior. We can cite examples from nature (see for example Bateson (1988))
to illustrate there is nothing in the “state of nature” to say that the “survival of the fittest” is the one
culture evident in nature, and we can even appeal to the works of anthropologists and psychologists for
examples of how human behavior has led and does lead “naturally” to cooperation, as opposed to unrestrained
competition. Burchell and Wilkinson, building on these aspects of conducting business, highlight what they
see as two dimensions of a business relationship, cooperation and competition: “Trading partners,” they argue,
“derive mutual benefits from cooperation in production from which their incomes are ultimately derived,
but they compete over the proceeds of production because what one gets the others cannot have. Every
business relationship is therefore by its nature both rivalrous and cooperative” (1997, 219). What we observe
in systems of production such as industrial districts is a greater emphasis being placed on the cooperative
aspects of the exchange relationship. Accepting that there are two sides to a business relationship, we are
confronted with the problem of making sure that economic actors who may prefer a cooperative option are
not the victims of opportunistic behavior.
One method of attempting to restrict opportunistic behavior is by organizing production within an institution
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such as a firm, as opposed to the institution of the market. Coase (1937) observed that there are instances
in which it is economically more efficient to do this. The costs of using the market mechanism can be
reduced by organizing production within the structure of the firm. Similarly, contracting arrangements
can act as a means of reducing the costs of coordination, but there are costs involved in establishing and
monitoring contracts (Williamson 1993). Furthermore, it has been observed (Macaulay 1963) that while
detailed clauses are often written into contracts they are seldom used: “contract and contract law are often
thought unnecessary because there are many effective non-legal sanctions. Two norms are widely accepted.
(1) Commitments are to be honoured in almost all situations; one does not welsh on a deal. (2) One ought
to produce a good product and stand behind it” (Macaulay 1963, 63). So even when measures are taken
to monitor actors’ behavior, it is often the case that an environment develops among those actors in which
implicit contracting makes enforcement unnecessary, and the cooperative aspect of trading surfaces once
again. These arguments tell us that although there are legal sanctions available for organizations to enforce
compliance, these are rarely used. These comments are worth bearing in mind in our examination of the
characteristics of trust and cooperation.
Gambetta (1988) in discussing the relationship between trust and cooperation argues that it is through
cooperation that trust will evolve. Gambetta defines trust as “a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both
before he can monitor such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a
context in which it affects his own action” (217). This definition raises two important points. First is its
implication that individual actors will calculate the probability of an actor behaving in a particular way,
suggesting that some of the actor’s behavior can be monitored. Second, Gambetta raises the possibility that
not all activities of an individual actor can be monitored. If actions cannot be monitored, what guarantee is
there that an actor will behave in the manner expected? How can cooperation be guaranteed? In situations
in which behavior cannot be monitored, is it worthwhile calculating the probability that the individual will
act in the expected manner? It will be argued below that where exchange takes place within productive
systems, institutions will develop which will ensure certain types of behavior. Using monitoring arrangements
suggests that there is some way of guaranteeing compliance, or at least some way to prevent opportunistic
behavior. In other words, Gambetta is moving beyond a simple transaction cost approach. And, Gambetta’s
definition implies that monitoring is not always necessary.
In line with Gambetta’s definition, the literature on industrial districts identifies trust and cooperation in
a way that transcends the notion of simply reducing transaction costs. The accepted values of trust and
cooperation transcend the productive units of the district and embrace the whole community. On this note,
Best (1990) states that “A carefully nurtured collective identity can potentially provide the social fabric which
sustains cooperation in an industrial district as in a corporation” (237). The identification of the industrial
district encompassing firms and a wider community as a whole, “as in a corporation,” is a point identified
by Becattini in his definition of an industrial district: “I define the industrial district as a socio-territorial
entity which is characterised by the active presence of both a community of people and a population of
firms in one historically bounded area....The most important trait of the local community is its relatively
homogeneous system of values and views...” (Becattini 1990, 38-39). This collective identity has resulted in a
large degree of trust and cooperation between the SMEs operating in the industrial districts of the Third
Italy’. It is worth reminding ourselves, however, that this collective identity, now acknowledged to be so
important to the success of these districts, has not always been present. Indeed the history of the Third Italy,
the most famous of the industrial districts, is littered with strife and conflict. While Capecchi (1990) provides
a picture of historical uniqueness based on the development of Emilia Romagna it is difficult to imagine that
the modern development of the region, which suffered large-scale factory closures immediately after World
War II, and witnessed a huge sectoral shift in employment from agriculture to industry over a twenty year
period, 1950-1970, could have occurred without social unrest. Sabel (1992), in discussing the building of
trust, suggests that the actors within the industrial districts of the Third Italy have developed a selective
history of the past: “it is not us outsiders but themselves that the tellers of these stories aim to fool; and it
is no fault but our own if their efforts to induce a kind of genesis amnesia in themselves lead us to believe
that their history was without conflict” (226). Sabel continues to document various conflicts within northern
and central Italy; a more detailed analysis can be found in Sabel (1982). Likewise Brusco (1982) cites the
impact of effective unions in the large factories of the industrial districts of the Third Italy as a reason for the
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development of SMEs, the large firms deliberately outsourcing as a means of breaking union organization.
The trust and cooperation occurring in the industrial districts of the Third Italy is of a differing order than
that occurring in a simple exchange relationship. We would argue that due to the establishment of a culture
of trust and cooperation between firms there we are witnessing economic interaction with limited calculation
and monitoring. In the literature at least three different types of trust are acknowledged: contractual trust,
competence trust and goodwill trust (Sako 1992). Contractual trust is the trust that exists between trading
partners and that results in the belief that goods will be delivered on time, be of the required specification
and be of the agreed quantity and quality. Competence trust refers to the belief that a trading partner will
fulfill a particular task. Goodwill trust occurs when initiatives are undertaken beyond the specific remit of a
contract: “the role of goodwill trust extends beyond existing relations and includes the transfer of new ideas
and new technology. Thus, while contractual and competence trust mainly benefit operational efficiency,
goodwill trust also contributes to the dynamic efficiency of productive systems” (Burchell and Wilkinson
1997, 218). Quite clearly, it is this latter type of trust that is to be found within the established industrial
districts. The question then arises, how can contractual trust be developed into goodwill trust? Put another
way, how can the cooperative aspect of an exchange relationship be developed so that cooperation and trust
become the norm for business undertakings?
This objective can be achieved by two related means: policy delivery and collective action. Policy delivery can
be utilized to promote a cultural change. Collective action needs to be developed to guarantee cooperation
and trust within the productive system. A pertinent example of policy delivery resulting in a cultural change
is provided by Hodgson (1988), who uses the example of the introduction of seat belt enforcement. Hodgson
points out that this policy initiative resulted in changed behavior. The policy was accompanied, of course,
by a degree of coercion. The chances of detecting that someone was not wearing a seat belt, however, were
slim, and the educational campaign highlighting the benefits of wearing seat belts was established long before
1983, when the law enforcing their use was introduced. Hodgson’s argument is that “The authority of the law
had the effect not simply of changing behaviour by the introduction of penalties or the perception of costs
and benefits. In addition, it changed these individuals themselves and their goals” (Hodgson 1988, 137). In
other words, through policy delivery individual behavior can be changed. Change affecting many individuals
will result in a different culture being established. Using coercion implies that action can be taken to ensure
compliance. Over-reliance on coercion, however, may well lead to distrust. Actors may well question the
amount they are actually trusted if they have to be continually monitored. More significantly, if one actor
is able to exercise coercion over another this suggests an unequal distribution of power in the relationship.
“It introduces an asymmetry which disposes of mutual trust and promotes instead power and resentment”
(Gambetta 1988, 220).
To overcome the potential for mistrust that the use of monitoring and punishment strategies to guarantee
compliance can breed, the promotion of collective action needs to be encouraged. Potential members need
to be aware of the benefits to be achieved from belonging to the productive system: “large organisations
that are not able to make membership compulsory must also provide some noncollective goods in order to
give potential members an incentive to join” (Olson 1971, 17). This promotion of collective action within
established productive systems, such as industrial districts, has led to the actors taking on a group identity,
as previous citations have indicated. The development of a group identity results in the individual actor
placing the group’s interests above his self-interest. However, even in productive systems in which members
appreciate that pursuing group interests leads to individual benefits, there is still the necessity for some
compulsion. Where elements of public goods are being delivered, there is always the temptation to “free-ride.”
Goods and services, such as facilities for engaging in R&D, are typically provided within industrial districts,
and contain elements of public goods. Cooperative advertising strategies promoting a region or country as a
whole indirectly advertise all businesses within the geographic area and hence suffer from the “free-rider”
problem. Within industrial districts the compulsion element resides in the fact that companies have to be a
member of the “club” (such as the Real Service Centre or a network) and if they break the rules, they can be
excluded. Once established inter-firm relationships develop norms of behavior, custom and practice facilitate
trust and cooperation, which can result in “embeddedness” (Granovetter 1985). Being a member of the club
leads to established relationships becoming long-term because of the investment a firm undertook to become
a member in the first place, and because if a firm did leave, “competitors and customers would ask why”
(Arrighetti et al. 1997, 190).
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In part 6.3 we have identified the dual nature of business relationships. There are economic gains to be
achieved, particularly for SMEs, by the promotion of the cooperative side of the business relationship. In order
to promote the cooperative side of a business relationship it is necessary to reduce the risk of opportunistic
behavior. This can be done by the promotion of trust and the establishment of inter-firm relationships. We
noted three different types of trust and argued that it is goodwill trust that should be sought in establishing
networking relationships between firms. We have further argued, by drawing on the experience of the Third
Italy, that policy delivery can assist in the development of trust and cooperation. While it would be desirable
for productive systems to avoid punishment strategies or enforcement mechanisms because of the danger
of promoting distrust, such strategies are always necessary, even in best practice examples of inter-firm
relationships. Enforcement mechanisms exist in the form of institutional norms and practices and in the
development of more concrete organizational structures. Member firms who “cheat” on other member firms
can be excluded from the institution or organization of which they are members. This idea of examining
firms within a framework of institutions and organizations suggests that SE, with its objective of establishing
networks, needs to develop a collective approach to the establishments of inter-firm relationships. We now
turn to examine the recent experiences of SE in its efforts to establish networking between firms within the
Scottish economy.
6.4 Scotland’s Business Birth Rate Strategy
As suggested above, Scotland could be described as an export-oriented economy, now relatively protected
from the United Kingdom’s business cycles, but open to new sensitivities. Scotland is especially locked into
the supply needs of multinational oligopolies in the electronics and oil sectors. It is clear that Scotland’s
future will depend upon European markets, and also, consequently, in attracting foreign direct investment
from North America and the Pacific Rim to enter the European Union. Exports surveys for Scotland show the
degree to which the historical patterns of trade have been transformed. According to a well established survey
(Scottish Council Development and Industry, 1997), two-thirds of Scottish exports go to western Europe.
Electronics products account for 49% of all sales overseas, most going to Europe and to a lesser extent the
Middle East and Africa (See SCDI and SE). Globalization of production in essence means multinational
enterprises arranging a configuration of plants across the world that meets their needs to supply exports to a
number of trading blocs. The deepening reliance of Scotland on the attraction of such titans means competing
for highly mobile investment, with this very competition between regions and states threatening to heighten
the propensity of such capital to be mobile. Without a counteracting, long-term sustainable development of
indigenous companies, it is recognized that peripheral economies progressively will lose further control over
their own destinies: the development of underdevelopment.
In implementing the twin supply-side strategies of inward investment and new firm formation to address
regional development and regeneration, RDAs and local authorities collectively arrange for property invest-
ments, improving the image of the area in the process. Training, technology transfer, information technology,
and telecommunications are also favored areas for investment through local, United Kingdom and European
Union interventions. Confirming such joint working, recent research (Danson et al. 1997) has demonstrated
the strength of the corporate consensus approach to regional policy in Scotland, with many adopting the
Scottish partnership model as the way to organize local and regional development strategies. At the political
and bureaucratic levels, then, networking and partnership are accepted as valuable features of economic
development strategies.
To what extent has this experience been applied to the implementation of the business birth rate strategy?
Addressing this question requires a consideration of the original and subsequent related research into the
low rates of new business start-ups in Scotland. As part of the overall study on this subject, SE sponsored
research on specific sectors that were considered to contain significant lessons or to have a key role in the
economy. Analysis of the clothing and textile industry showed that the popular view of company failures and
declining employment was disguising the actual and potential contributions of new firms to the industry in
Scotland. However, the role of new firms in the industry was restricted by a lack of innovation and dynamism.
Evidence from Italy and Germany, with their strong networking traditions, suggested that the clothing and
textile industry had the potential to make a more significant contribution to the economy. This evidence
suggests that development through growth in the number of new, small firms rather than expanding the size
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of existing companies is the best way forward. In this context, Johnstone and McLachlan (1996) examined
the internationalization of SMEs in a region of Scotland - Ayrshire. The two examined in particular the
development of networking through the establishment of export consortia. They found that recent attempts to
improve competitiveness through pooling of capabilities, with the local enterprise agency acting as facilitator,
produced mixed results. The reluctance of firms to participate fully in the network was a clear obstacle to
realizing economies of scale and scope, with “a low level of trust and the strongly adversarial nature of the
[local] sector” (755) a significant factor. Unwillingness to pool resources, concern over allocation of orders
within the network, apprehension over cooperation, and a failure to communicate were all cited as reasons
for the lack of a full commitment to the project by the member firms. The need for training in networking
protocol and processes, the key role of the facilitator, and the benefits of contractual agreements among
members were identified as necessary for the local industry to create a successful cluster. Further details of
this study are given in section 5.
Looking at high tech and academic spin-offs, the economic consultants PACEC reported minor differences
in the factors explaining low levels of NFF in these specific sectors and in the overall economy. PACEC
perceived the research base within industry to be inadequate, with few organizations acting efficiently as
incubators for spin-outs and new high tech companies. The infra- and super-structure were deemed deficient,
with poorly developed and weak specialist resources, social networks and information flows within the high
tech community. PACEC highlighted the lack of demand for high tech companies. This lack of demand,
PACEC concluded, constrained development of a home base and put firms at a cost disadvantage in export
markets. In comparison with other areas, notably Massachusetts, policy support was seen as less extensive.
Problems in establishing a high tech firm were compounded by the actual process of formation and growth,
with the lack of support and ambition at home stunting development opportunities. All of these problems
seemed minor compared with problems facing academic spin-offs, the authors argued. Major restrictions
in promoting new firm formation were identified in Scottish higher and further education institutions and
in their business, funding and cultural environments. Entrepreneurship was perceived as alien to academic
traditions, risky and stigmatizing, so that significant barriers to entry into the marketplace had been erected.
Westhead and Cowling (1995) also looked at high tech business start-ups and questioned the certainty of such
conclusions. They believe that the debates on the major factors affecting high-tech firms are still unresolved.
In a study from the United States, Muniak (1994) has argued that there are essential conflicts over the
promotion of regeneration policies at the urban and at the national level. In the same vein, and as seen
here, much of the policy and analysis in the United Kingdom seems to suggest that the needs of local and of
national economies may not be coincidental with regard to the encouragement of high tech and academic
entrepreneurs. Policies to improve NFF in the country as a whole may lead to different effects across regions,
perhaps providing strong virtual and vicious cycles of uneven development.
These various studies on high tech and academic spin-outs and starts suggest that networking, partnership,
trust and cooperation were poorly developed or actively discouraged in Scotland. The role of branch plants
in diminishing the ability of entrepreneurs to set up their own businesses was noted frequently, as more
unexpectedly was the skepticism and obstruction of the business development and academic establishments.
In section 5 we highlighted the problems of developing an embedded cluster in the electronics industry in
Scotland. Research by Lipka and Howie (1993) on the North Sea oil industry has demonstrated that Scottish
companies tend to be restricted to the peripheral, low value added areas of the sector, such as catering,
supplies, labor-only contracts, and maintenance. Unable to integrate forward because of a lack of market
strength and too low on the value chain to establish an export oriented sector of any note, such companies
realize few opportunities by cooperating in an industrial cluster.
One model to address such problems is corporate venturing. Corporate venturing covers assistance to
entrepreneurs or SMEs to exploit new ideas, corporate restructuring through staff creation of new independent
businesses, and the development of new profit centers and subsidiaries to exploit new products, processes
and markets. It has been suggested (SE 1993) that Scotland is poorly provided with such approaches to
regeneration and restructuring, which is unfortunate because, by reducing risk and establishing new ventures
with better prospects, these approaches offer an effective, additional element in promoting NFF, especially in
the high tech industry.
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A perennial problem facing new entrepreneurs in Scotland, and in the United Kingdom more generally,
concerns financial support. Considering the extensive research on financial aspects of supporting new firms
and networks, the SE (1993) findings proposed an attempt to close the widening equity and financial gap
with a move to the provision of risk finance by the public sector and by the private investor, the so-called
“business angel.” Some of the sections on finance in Scotland’s Business Birth Rate (“Finance - The Big
Issue?,” “Informal Investment - A Neglected Source?,” and “Finance - The Ongoing Debate”) suggest that
little of this problem has been resolved. The equity gap is contrasted with the availability of money; the
question of access is a major and persistent feature in the Scottish business environment, and to a greater
extent than elsewhere. Given the significant power and size of the Scottish financial sector, its invention
and introduction to the world of investment and unit trusts, and its strong history of (savings) banking,
there is an argument that “improvements in the behaviour and performance of both lenders/investors and
actual/potential business founders” can and must be encouraged (SE 1993).
Many of the factors influencing enterprise creation and regional economic development raised in the SE
inquiry are common to most communities, and arguments surrounding these factors are well rehearsed
elsewhere. However, the inquiry’s identification of entrepreneurial potential and cultural issues as significant
adds an extra dimension to our understanding of the processes involved in NFF. The SE research directly
challenges the business development community in Scotland to address its own behavior and attitudes toward
potential entrepreneurs. The SE inquiry used extensive interviews across several countries, and literature
reviews, to establish the comparative levels of interest in entrepreneurship, perceptions and experience of
entrepreneurship, and social attitudes towards enterprise. According to the research results, the perception
of entrepreneurs by the community in Scotland was less positive than it was elsewhere. Recognition of
entrepreneurs’ contributions to the economy was not sufficient to undermine the key role the community
reserved for government intervention (Figure 6.3). The Scottish perception may be a reaction to Thatcherism,
but it is undoubtedly related to Scotland’s economic and social history. It has been argued that persistent
unemployment, poverty and deprivation, against a relative economic decline of eighty years duration (Danson
1991), have thralled Scots to the philosophy of collective intervention to generate jobs. Entrepreneurs were
seen in these surveys as being less caring and community oriented than the respondents. As argued here, the
strategies of SE, with their denial of the relevance of trust and cooperation, have exaggerated rather than
addressed this view (See Figure 6.3: What people think about entrepreneurs).
Although further analysis by SE (1993) showed a lower pool of self-confessed, potential entrepreneurs, there
was still a substantial proportion of adults who believed they had the ability and desire to run their own
businesses. Statistics suggest that there was no anti-enterprise or dependency culture; rather, with much
unexploited potential, there seemed to be a barrier to converting desire into reality.
A closer look at the SE analysis suggested that the very agencies established to promote business start-ups
lacked trust and cooperation in the indigenous entrepreneurs under their charge. Interviews with the business
development industry and among opinion-formers demonstrated complacency, a less than positive attitude
to policies promoting new SMEs. They also revealed that among members of these groups, there was a
dependency culture in which it was believed that native Scots entrepreneurs could not be a dynamic part
of the regeneration process. A misperception of the characteristics of indigenous people, and therefore of
potential entrepreneurs, was not uncommon, with some agencies suggesting higher barriers were required to
limit entry by local businesses into the market.
Many of the concepts at the heart of regional economic development strategies, such as the encouragement of
inward investment, the avoidance and fear of displacement, and the provision of business advice, suggest that
they may in their implementation corrupt the promotion of NFF in ways not identified before. So, while
dominant and branch plants have been considered as potential destroyers of entrepreneurship (Fothergill and
Gudgin 1982; Storey 1982), the reality may be more complex. There is evidence that RDAs and government
departments have been opposing management spin-outs, effectively scuppering the opportunity for technology
based developments by sanctioning the closure of R&D laboratories in nationalized industries, and dampening
enthusiasm and support for management/worker rescues of branch plant closures (Strathclyde Regional
Council 1988; Danson 1991). The rationale for the agencies’ actions is that, with the views of overseas owners
and future investors paramount, the position of inward investment agencies cannot be compromised in the
international market for mobile capital.
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Figure 6.3
The SE analysis concludes that concerns over displacement dominate much thinking, while there is scant
recognition given to the longer term processes of innovation, dynamism and efficiency. Protecting the status
quo is preferred to encouraging indigenous start-ups (SE 1993, 23). Research such as that done by SE is
indicative of a wider, growing interest in the concept and importance of social networks in the entrepreneurial
creation process. Recognizing this interest, SE addressed the role of networking directly. Its analysis revealed
Scotland as having a more extreme set of rules and social mores in determining support and advice. Those
who would have most difficulty establishing a business elsewhere - the young, women and the working class,
appear to face higher hurdles in Scotland than in the southeast of England and beyond. Lack of security and
of alternative employment in the event of failure, and the effects on family life of creating a new firm are the
major concerns of potential entrepreneurs according to the SE report (1993, 24). The report expressed the
view that these problems could be overcome in some instances by wider discussions with informed contacts and
with existing entrepreneurs. This seems all the more important given the less than positive attitude of business
development organizations toward entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, the low level of entrepreneurship identified
above becomes self perpetuating in these circumstances, compounding the earlier barriers to enterprise.
Knowing an entrepreneur is an important rocket for changing someone from a potential to an actual business
creator. Those who are most dissuaded from making the transition are least likely to have a set of relevant
contacts. In addition to financial support problems, the greater severity of funding problems in Scotland
is associated with the lower degree of penetration of the ideology of the property-owning democracy there.
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With the United Kingdom’s funding bodies showing a preference for mortgages on borrowers’ homes to be
used as collateral, there is an additional barrier to establishing companies in areas where owner occupation of
housing has tended to be low traditionally.
McNicoll (1996) and Whittam and Kirk (1996) have discussed this set of elements in more detail. McNicoll,
on behalf of SE, concluded that encouragement of the idea of entrepreneurship would often be sufficient to
prevent most potential ventures from failing to reach the starting line, despite the environment of hurdles
and obstacles. Struthers et al. (1996) add an interesting discussion of recent developments in Russia, where
the restructuring of the last few years has highlighted a number of key issues. Not least among these are
the importance of market defining characteristics (indeed prerequisites) of property rights, contract laws,
information, and degrees of risk and uncertainty. The influence of organizations and individuals within
current and former networks is shown to be significant in the processes of new firm formation and business
development. This discussion of the role of information and networks is extended by Devins (1996), when he
considers measures taken to overcome market failure to provide business advice and knowledge. The dual
need to monitor and evaluate advice programs and services, and to know the companies supported, are seen
as essential to the long-term health of the new firm sector.
Curran and Leitch have presented (Figure 6.4) a stylized account of the development of linkages and networks
as they affect different-sized companies and organizations in response to external environmental changes.
Examples of such changes include the establishment of the single European market and new forms of enterprise
regulation. Such changes always affect and are qualified by the system and strength of the local and regional
networks within a locality.
Figure 6.4
Harrison and Leitch (1996), in considering Northern Ireland’s experience, argue for the establishment of
entrepreneurial teams to progress business ideas and opportunities, positively assembling a collection of talent
and expertise, rather than an approach that passively supports the market. The consensus, here as earlier, is
for intervention to overcome market failure in labor, capital, land, and knowledge sectors, but to address the
establishment of trust and cooperation directly.
In summary, the business birth rate strategy in Scotland has tended to be passive with regard to the promotion
of trust and cooperation. Networking is identified as important but is to be encouraged at the level of
the individual entrepreneur on an atomistic basis. This approach to networking contrasts sharply with
the extensive and successful model of regeneration established between the regional economic development
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agencies and organizations themselves, and with the industrial clusters of traditional sectors that created the
nineteenth century Scottish economy.
6.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that the economic development of the Scottish economy suggests that there
is scope for the establishment of networking arrangements once again. To ensure the success of potential
networks, SE needs to move from contractual trust to goodwill trust within the networking arrangements. To
achieve this it is necessary to develop a group approach to firm organization. This requires the involvement of
all potential firms in the decision-making process to make sure that the needs of the firms are being catered
to within the networks. This collective approach is required because the services being delivered within the
network of firms will consist of elements of public goods such as information. We have noted that within
networking arrangements punishment strategies exist, but rather than prohibiting trust, these strategies can
enhance it, acting as a safeguard mechanism. With an economy dominated by branch plants, however, it is
unclear how multinational enterprises can be encouraged to adopt more cooperative strategies, and so to
become more embedded into the Scottish economy.
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This chapter was first published in European Research in Regional Science, volume 7: Regional governance
and economic development, 1997 pp. 1-6 (Pion Limited, London).
7 Regional Development and Multilevel Governance
7.1 Introduction
The addressing of regional problems throughout the developed world through regional industrial policy and
regional planning has fluctuated according to relative economic performance, political support and ideology,
and policy priorities. Regional intervention has undergone various metamorphoses, such as the growing use of
RDAs. It has also reflected other influences, including European Union funding on that continent and the
perceived benefits of relying on inward investment rather than indigenous growth.
As has been argued here, no singular approach or theory can lead to a full understanding of all the forces and
pressures on decision-makers to adopt a particular approach to regional economic development. Some (e.g.
Wannop 1995) have noted, therefore, that an analysis and an understanding of regional intervention and
regional planning has to take account of wider political analyses. This signifies a new appreciation of the
form, nature and potential of mechanisms and instruments of regional intervention. Thus, “since regional
issues are recurrent, regional planning and governance are essential acts in continually managing an imperfect
system of governance” (Wannop 1995, xxi).
The environments of such federal states as the United States and Germany suggest a different set of
relationships between different levels of government than more centralized countries such as France and Italy.
The political context of regional policy and regional planning in the United Kingdom, for instance, has been
that of a unitary state. Within this context, the partial devolution of responsibility for administration or
implementation was performed according to geographical area (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and
function (including training and development agencies). In the last two years of this millennium, however,
political changes are accelerating the slow devolution of administrative powers. Thus, alternative constitutional
arrangements are being put into place that will transform the context within which regional governance and
intervention takes place. Debates over such arrangements are not new: Kindle (1997) highlights the role
federalism has played in constitutional debates in the United Kingdom at different times.
This section addresses the issues of regional constitutional change, regional autonomy, and regional planning
and policy. It calls upon the revealed experiences of a number of states with a variety of constitutional
forms in evidence. The discussions in this section are concerned specifically with the appropriateness of
regional intervention under alternative regional forms of governance. In the United Kingdom, in particular,
the introduction of a Scottish Parliament, a Welsh assembly and English regional assemblies poses challenges
and opportunities for regional policy and planning. The United Kingdom’s political agenda appears to
favor a regionalization of governance and posits a recognition of a regional problem in terms of relative
economic, social and environmental indicators. This is ironic because at the same time, the new constitutional
arrangements require careful consideration of the appropriateness of existing regional instruments. Horsman
and Marshall (1995, ix) address the need they see for economic changes on a larger scale; “The traditional
nation state, the fruit of centuries of political, social and economic evolution, is under threat. Changes in the
structure of the international economy, technological advance, and the end of the Cold War will force - indeed
are already forcing - a realignment of the relations among states, citizens and the international economy.”
A further irony can be seen in the apparent contradictory growth of regionalism or nationalism at the same
time as the growth of the supra-national powers of the European Union. This is happening through closer
scrutiny and regulation of the national policies of the member states of the European Union, and through
increased intervention in the regional and national restructuring programs in these areas.
Undoubtedly some of the strongest forces acting on the communities, regions and nations throughout the
developed world arise in the globalization of production and markets. The Group of Lisbon (1995) articulated
some of the pressures brought about by these processes of global competition that are redefining the central
role played by the nation state and national capitalism. The Group points to the increasing complexity
of world events, the power of globalization, the fragility of the ecosystem, the threats to global political
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democracy, scientific and technological change and “the paucity of social justice and of cultural dialogue and
tolerance” (Group of Lisbon 1995, 141).
This quote also serves to illustrate the international dimension to the research agenda of this piece, and
the need for the academic, policymaker and practitioner communities wherever they are located to refer to
experiences outside of their areas to enlighten debate. Similarly, what is clear from much of the literature is
that, although many authors may draw on fiscal federalism and networking theories to explain or understand
the likely consequences of changing patterns of regional governance, they demonstrate the paucity of many
economic approaches to the analysis of the links between varying levels of regional autonomy and economic
development. This confirms the need for a wider reading of the literature than a simple single discipline
approach, and especially a better appreciation of the significance of shifts in behavior and attitudes arising
from changes in regional governance forms.
There are three organizing themes to this section: the first concerns the forms of federalism and networking
that are appropriate to regional economic and constitutional autonomy. The second sets out the evolving
ideas associated with regional governance, institutions and development. The third theme concerns the fiscal
and monetary regimes appropriate to regional autonomy and regional economic development.
7.2 Federalism and networking
Roberts (1997)28 provides a comprehensive overview of changing regional constitutional forms and the
appropriateness of arrangements for regional planning and regional economic development in the United
Kingdom. He refers to the extensive European research on such forms of governance, documenting new and
emerging challenges to traditional regional planning practice and changes to the institutional context within
which regional planning operates. In highlighting the dynamics of regional planning, Roberts makes reference
to three crosscutting themes which he argues will dominate debates about appropriate regional problems,
policies, instruments and institutions in the next few years. These themes are territoriality, sustainability and
spatial competence. In particular, he suggests that regional planning in the future will have to address the
delicate relationship between economic progress and environmental quality within a sustainable framework.
These themes will need addressing, he argues, whatever the constitutional agenda of the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, he points to the need to be able to devise and to implement strategy as the bedrock of regional
planning.
The discussions pursued by Roberts are useful in highlighting the differences in the relative competence
of regional and local authorities across the European Union and beyond. Following Wiehler and Stumm
(1995)29 four groups of subnational government can be classified:
• Regions with wide-ranging powers (e.g. the German Länder)
• Regions with advanced powers (e.g. the Spanish autonomous communities)
• Regions with limited powers (e.g. Dutch provinces)
• Regions with no powers (e.g. the Greek nomoi, Portuguese planning regions, Irish counties, English
counties, and Northern Ireland)
Recent developments are obviously changing this list, with Northern Ireland in particular moving up the
ladder of autonomy. Nevertheless, the variety within the European Union is clear, and it stands in contrast
with the position and indeed the stability of the central-local government relationships in such nations as the
United States.
The lack of spatial competence, the imposition of top-down policies and other reasons blamed for the failure of
regional planning by Roberts (1997)30 have gradually been addressed within the European context by a move
back toward enhanced regional autonomy and responsibility. The significance of the European dimension
28Sustainability and spatial competence: an examination of the evolution, ephemeral nature, and possible future development
of regional planning in Britain’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson (ed.) , European Research in
Regional Science 7, Pion: London.
29’The powers of regional and local authorities and their role in the European Union.’ European Planning Studies 3, 227-250.
30Roberts op cit
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cannot be neglected here. The European regional structural funds, and their preferred delivery mechanism of
the partnership model, have been critical not only in establishing regional networks of agencies and authorities,
but also in creating the conditions and environment for quasi-regional governance structures. These have
undoubtedly been instrumental in convincing the administrations of some national governments that greater
devolution has benefits.
These points are echoed by Armstrong (1997)31 who, in the context of the proposed English regional assemblies,
draws out the characteristics of multijurisdictional planning frameworks in which the principal issue is the
optimal assignment of functions. While confirming the theoretical case for regional level institutional
intervention for the purposes of regional planning and development, Armstrong stresses the need for flexibility
to allow for the different interests involved at the subregional level. The subregional level has remained a
relatively isolated area for debate, although attention is now being paid to the role of local government within
new forms of regional constitutional governance (Sinclair 1997).
Cappellin (1997) has examined the nature of federalism and the network approach to national regional policy
in the volume that contains Roberts’s and Armstrong’s works32. He views these as a means of facilitating
the cooperation and/or competition between different national and regional institutions. He stresses a new
approach to regional development policy and planning within a federal arrangement based on public-private
partnership (rather than on public authority). The aim of the partnership approach is to create flexible
mechanisms of governance of those public-private relationships in order to establish a strategic agenda for
change. This can be achieved through the establishing of networks that stress the transactions between
institutions and partners rather than the older prescriptive or centralized “top down” system.
These studies show that there are connections between the different areas of governance and methods of
analysis. The micro-, meso- and macro-levels obviously interact in ways that make it difficult to separate the
varying forces and forms of influence.
Haynes, Maas, Stough and Riggle (1997)33, in contrast to the pictures painted of these fairly centralized
countries, have analyzed the experience of regionalism within the federal systems of government in Germany,
Canada and the United States. In particular, they consider the obstacles to establishing and maintaining
regional coherence in policy and planning. These include sectoral bias and the emphasis of the role of
institutions and policies in regional representation and empowerment. Their discussion of regional development
within a federal system offers some important insights into planning intervention at a regional level in a
unitary state. The principal lesson it offers is that it is important to acknowledge that policymakers are
dealing with regional jurisdictions in a constant process of dynamic realignment. The authors reach the
conclusion that a federal system does not automatically imply that the regional dimension is recognized or
that appropriate arrangements flow out of federal institutions.
Returning to the theme of networks, Eser (1997) examines the lessons that city networks have provided
Germany. In Germany, city networks represent a form of strategic planning within a federal system. Eser
views these as a form of regional planning mechanism that can secure a strategic perspective on meeting
the needs of economic development in localities where economic spillovers exist. He stresses, however, the
extent to which normative issues can be integrated into the networking approach to regional planning and
development.
7.3 Governance, Institutions and Development
As described elsewhere in these learning materials, the arrangements for regional governance are changing
within the United Kingdom especially radically. The changes have provided a rich source of material for
political scientists in recent times, and a proving ground for a limited number of economists to try to
understand the implications of such changes for the economic development of particular areas. Nowhere are
31’Regional-level jurisdictions and economic regeneration initiatives’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M
Danson (ed.), European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London.
32’Federalism and the network paradigm: guidelines for a new approach in national regional policy’ Regional Governance and
Economic Development, M Danson (ed.) , European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London.
33’Regional governance and economic development: lessons from federal states’ in Regional Governance and Economic
Development, M Danson (ed.) , European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London.
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these proposed evolutions going to have an impact more strongly than in Scotland. Scotland now has its own
democratically elected Parliament for the first time in its history, which is remarkable given the span of its
history.
In work joining a growing library of publications on the devolved Scottish Parliament, Newlands (1997)
has considered its economic powers and potential34. The Parliament will represent a new form of regional
government in the United Kingdom, and Newlands draws on economic theory to explore the potential impacts
of such a body and its related powers. Drawing from the American literature in particular, Newlands focuses
on the fundamental macroeconomic objectives of government: stabilization, distribution, allocation and
growth functions. Newlands argues that the focus of debate and appraisal is most appropriately directed at
the processes of sustaining growth and development. This allows him to demonstrate that such a body as the
Scottish Parliament may benefit those beyond its own boundaries and the national economy. Significantly, and
appropriately, he stresses the uncertainties associated with establishing this new form of regional government
and the care that will have to be exercised in its execution and implementation. Newlands argues that in many
areas and communities, the development or devolution of specific new regional powers can lead to “backlash”
effects and other reactions that may undermine any universally favorable developments. Such analyses as
Newlands’s, based on successful and stable models elsewhere, can be applied to prevent unfavorable effects of
devolution. Newlands’s line of argument links explicitly the key issues of taxation, expenditure and economic
growth to a subnational layer of governance, and to the Scottish Parliament in particular.
A particular area of debate in any country concerns the direct financial costs of operating a local or regional
government. Bryan and Hill (1997) have discussed35 the costs and benefits of a Welsh Assembly, again by
referring to the United States’s federal literature36 as enlightening for the regional scientist. They concentrate
on an investigation of the synergies made possible between government agencies and departments and other
organizations within an area once devolution of power is introduced. However, although they see the potential
for specific improvements, enhancements and innovations in linkages between economic agents and players
within Wales after the establishment of a Welsh Assembly, they view the importance of subjective views as
being as powerful as economic logic in the final public analysis.
Hill and Morgan (1997) also consider the interactions between inward investment, supplier networks and
regional growth within a regional governance framework. They examine the trends in foreign direct investment
and its impact on regional economic development in Wales. In analyzing the characteristics of growth potential
through inward investment and the importance of networking and facilitating vertical and horizontal links
between firms, they highlight the anticipated advantages of embedding existing foreign direct investments
into the regional economy over the attraction of new projects.
Continuing on this theme of the key lubrication qualities perceived to flow from regional governance incentives,
Raines and Wishlade (1997)37 discuss cross European perspectives on the use and control of financial incentives
in foreign investment promotion. They consider the propriety of using incentives for foreign direct investment
in regional economic development and the extent to which European Union and national regulations can
modify such arrangements. Their discussion provides an important insight into how external environmental
changes around regional institutions impose potential limitations on regional planning and policy strategies.
The key role played by the “civil service” of the European Union - the European Commission - is stressed
by Raines and Wishlade as well as other commentators; however, they recognize the limited competencies
and effective powers of the Commission. Its reliance on member states to police many of the regulations
and its requirement to pay heed to political considerations restrict its autonomy in reality. Raines and
Wishlade’s work helps confirm to the regional scientist the need to apply a range of expertise and disciplines
to evaluations of the relationships between multilevels of governance.
34See both his chapter ’The economic powers and potential of a devolved Scottish parliament: lessons from economic theory
and European experience’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson (ed.) , European Research in Regional
Science 7, Pion: London, and his jointly edited book with John McCarthy.
35’The costs and benefits of an Assembly for Wales’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson (ed.) ,
European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London
36They cite the work of P Peterson in particular The Price of Federalism, The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1995.
37In Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson (ed.), European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion:
London
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7.4 Fiscal and Monetary Regimes
Finally, this section considers the nature and appropriateness of different monetary and fiscal regimes for
regional autonomy. The financial settlement between different layers of a multigovernance system can create
tensions and conflicts that may negate many of the advantages of devolution and regional autonomy. One of
the principal needs of late, therefore, in those states which have been decentralizing, as well as within the
European Union as whole, has been to try and introduce a more objective and less emotive approach to
analyzing the funding and expenditure plans for regional and other subnational governments. Laramie and
Mair (1997)38 have applied experiences and theories developed in North America, but especially the arguments
developed by Keynes’s contemporary, the Polish economist Kalecki39, to examine the macroeconomic effects
of regional tax differentials. Laramie and Mair’s work was undertaken with special reference to the so-called
“tartan tax,” which will be associated with the proposed Scottish Parliament. The tartan tax is a local
income tax to be applied in Scotland, and its application will mark the first time such a regional tax has
been imposed in the United Kingdom. Laramie and Mair consider this in the context of economic growth
and make a case which is well founded in theory for a property based source of finance for the Parliament.
As it is providing such an interesting experiment in the United Kingdom, and as it may have far reaching
consequences for the continuation of this particular union, there has been a rash of papers and studies on
the effects of the “tartan tax.” McGregor, Stevens, Swales and Yin (1997)40 have provided a more detailed
analysis of the financial aspects of a Scottish Parliament and an evaluation of a tartan tax. To undertake
this analysis, they utilize their computable general equilibrium model of the Scottish economy, a “flex-price”
model, to estimate the likely impacts of devolution in a very open regional economy. Scotland operates within
the customs union of the European Union with all its restrictions on anti-competitive behavior, and has
a very high propensity to export - in reality it serves as production base for non-European multinational
enterprises to enter the European market. Therefore, many of the traditional levers open to an independent
state are not available to it. As with other authors discussed above, MacGregor et al. argue that the link
between macro policy and regional development is an important theme in composing the arrangements for
regional governance and autonomy. They also stress, however, that there is a need for positive intervention in
the economy to realize the benefits of devolution, opening up discussion on how potential advantages can be
gained through the involvement of the social partners in wage bargaining, investment and public expenditure
and budgeting strategies. Within the framework of a balanced budget strategy, they demonstrate how an
expansion of the Scottish economy could be achieved, but apparently only with a social contract between
labor and the Parliament.
In other contexts, especially federal countries, there are usually better developed methods of dealing with
inter-regional financial settlements. Established traditions, practices and systems of constitutional law address
the problems of multigovernance structures. Kellerman and Schmidt (1997) have looked at the German case
to investigate how such settlements relate to growth and development across the country41. They offer an
insight into the different arrangements for taxation policy and regional development in a federal system.
They demonstrate different mechanisms and philosophies for transferring finance and resources from region
to region within such a country. Such flows are considered to be the costs or the lubricants necessary to
maintain the viability of the federal nation state, and they may promise advantages to all parts of the country.
Their analysis suggests that a tax sharing system can lead to a more efficient inter-regional allocation of
capital with a possibility of higher national aggregate growth. It also serves as a reminder of the differences
between a true federation and that definition of the European Union used by Eurosceptics (or more correctly
Europhobes) in Britain to describe the present constitutional governance of the European Union.
Finally, there have been a host of studies on the how idiosyncrasies of particular regions, conurbations and
communities can explain the relative good or poor performance of different areas. Doeringer, Terkla and
Topakian (1987), for instance, have captured the essence of this genre in their volume entitled Invisible
38’Macroeconomic effects of regional tax differentials: a post-Keynesian analysis’ in Regional Governance and Economic
Development, M Danson (ed.) , European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London
39’A theory of commodity, income and capital taxation’ Economic Journal 47, 444-450.
40’Some simple macroeconomics of Scottish devolution’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson (ed.)
, European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London
41’Regional growth and convergence in a tax-sharing system’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson
(ed.), European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London
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Factors in Local Economic Development (1987)42. Porter’s study, The Competitive Advantage of Nations
(1990)43, has been applied at several levels of multigovernance systems. Porter notes the increasing openness
of national and regional markets. He demonstrates, though, that in an progressively globalizing world with
restrictions imposed by such organizations as customs unions and the World Trade Organization, there are
still areas for fruitful discretion in policy terms for local, regional and subnational governments and their
partners. Dow (1997)44 discusses an example of the use of such discretion when she considers the role of
financial sector and monetary policy under a regional government, in this case Scotland. Dow draws parallels
with other systems. But adopting a traditional Scottish Political Economy approach, she also draws upon
the distinctiveness and historical significance of the country’s banking sector to argue that major innovations
can be introduced in credit policy to the benefit of both industrial and economic objectives. Perhaps most
important in her analysis is the identification of the ability of regional governments to intervene in their
economies in imaginative ways that fit their constituencies’ needs more neatly than the top-down approaches
of the unitary state. Whether the key players in the financial sectors of these communities wish to realize
this is, of course, another matter.
42P.B. Doeringer, D.G. Terkla and G.C. Topakian, 1987, New York: OUP.
431990, London: Macmillan.
44’Scottish devolution and the financial sector’ in Regional Governance and Economic Development, M Danson (ed.) ,
European Research in Regional Science 7, Pion: London.
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8 An Examination of Two Case Studies
8.1 Introduction
In this section we look at two case studies that highlight several of the main points raised in previous sections.
The first case study focuses on the industry districts of Emilia Romagna in northeast Italy. These spatially
specific production systems have been widely researched and are identified as “the model” of contemporary
Marshallian industrial districts. The operation of these districts identifies the productive system beyond a
narrow interpretation of the productive system concept, as definitions in section 2 made clear. The governance
structure of these districts is regarded as being based on trust and cooperation, so an examination of the
districts will help demonstrate a system in which these concepts are significant.
8.2 Third Italy
Of all the regional economies in which industrial districts have been “discovered,” the districts of northcentral
Italy are the most widely cited. These districts are commonly known as the “Third Italy” to distinguish them
from the established industrial districts of northern Italy and the relatively under-industrialized southern
Italy. It is to a review of the literature that describes the establishment of the districts of the Third Italy
that we now turn (See Bergman and Feser, “Industrial and Regional Clusters: Concepts and Comparative
Applications” in the Regional Science Web Book for further information).
See Figure 8.1: Pattern of light industrialization locals ystems: the Third Italy and Figure 8.2: Marshallian
industrial districts within the pattern of light industrialisation local systems 1981.
Figure 8.1 Figure 8.2
Brusco (1982) argues that the historic development of the districts can be found in viewing the specific
industrial development within the region. In particular, Brusco identifies two developments that gave rise to
the dominance of small medium enterprises (SMEs) in the region. The first was the growth of the traditional
artisan sector; the second was deconcentration and the rise of subcontracting. This rise in deconcentration
was due to two factors. The first was the rise of a strong trade union movement in the 1960s within the then
dominant large firm sector. To counteract the organized labor force the large firms followed a strategy of
contracting out to the SME sector. The second factor was the changing nature of consumer demand away
from standardized mass consumption goods and toward high value-added, differentiated goods and services.
This switch in demand gave rise to different types of techniques of production, such as flexible specialization,
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which gave SMEs a competitive edge.
Within the industrial districts of the Third Italy, however, there were also policy initiatives which encouraged
SMEs generally and artisan firms in particular. Artisan firms, or artigiano, refers in the Italian context to
craftsmen and craftswomen who not only work as skilled workers but also engage in the organization and the
running of businesses (Best 1990). The legal position of an artisan firm, according to legislation passed in
1986, states that the owner of the firm must be a working manager and that at least one other member of the
firm must be from the same family. Incentives exist to encourage firms to register as artisan firms as opposed
to industrial firms.
In analyzing how the artisan firms became established in spatially specific industrial locations, that is,
industrial districts, Brusco makes a distinction between two stages of development. The first stage was
characterized by public bodies’ encouragement of the artisan firms in a manner that lacked an overall policy
framework. What this stage witnessed, though, was increased cooperation between the artisan firms and
policymakers and enforcers. The second stage saw the establishment of specific agencies such as Real Service
Centres, which led to the development of networking between the artisan firms and the policy agents.
This second stage involved a more proactive industrial policy on behalf of policymakers. This policy, for
example, led to the establishment of artisan parks on land purchased at favorable prices from the large
landowners. This activity involved the local authorities working with the artisan associations, the banking
sector and landowners (Brusco 1989).
Alongside proactive policies such as the acquisition of land at favorable prices, the artisan firms themselves
formed organizations such as Artisan Associations to promote policies and institutional frameworks that
would help them to be successful. The local Artisan Associations are affiliated with the Confederation
Nazionale Dell’Artizianato (CNA). The Associations, both nationally and locally, are organized through a
democratically elected management committee, the majority of whose members must themselves be artisans.
This has led to the artisan firms being able to reap internal and external economies of scale and to develop a
degree of cooperation that has been essential for the success of the proactive industrial policy pursued in the
region.
In analyzing the activities of the CNA, Best (1990) found that it was the largest of four national confederations
of artisan firms. Within the province of Modena, the local CNA branch has 14,000 member firms (representing
39,000 workers), and sixty locations within the province for supplying administrative services to artisan firms,
such as accountancy, financial and marketing services. The provision of such services by agencies inspired by
the CNA has been likened to small firms having the headquarters of a large firm, enabling the members of the
CNA to accrue both internal and external economies of scale. Indeed, it has been argued, “scale economies at
the level of the firm are hypothesized to have become less important, altogether, replaced by the achievement
of such efficiencies at the level of the district (or network) as a whole” (Harrison 1990, 5). A survey of small
firms by the Small Business Research Centre (1992) demonstrated a link between the amount of external
advice taken and the rate of growth of small firms. The provision of services provided by CNA-inspired
institutions, then, would appear to be fundamental to the growth and development of small firms.
Additionally, the CNA is involved in Loan Guarantee Schemes such as the Financial Consortia operated in
Modena. The scheme is based on cooperation between small firms and local and national government and is
operated by a board representing member firms and the CNA. The loan guarantee fund consists of moneys
from local, regional and national government plus firms’ membership fees. Any member firm requiring a loan
obtains a report from the local CNA which, if approved by the local CNA and the Financial Consortia, is sent
to a bank with a loan guarantee (Best 1990). There is a twofold enforcement mechanism designed to ensure
that firms do not abuse the scheme. First, “self-policing” ensures as far as possible that only potentially
winning ideas are promoted for finance, and second, firms that default can be barred from applying again.
The success of the scheme can be gauged by the low level of bad debts; according to Best (1990) less than
0.2% of borrowers default on their loans. As Brusco comments, “the person who receives a loan from the
co-operative will stay up at night thinking of ways of repaying his loan; whereas the person who receives a
bank loan will stay up at night thinking of ways of not repaying his loan” (Brusco 1985).
A further initiative was launched in the mid-1970s and 1980s, that of the Real Service Centres, coinciding with
a more proactive policy stance from the state agencies. ERVET (Regional Board for Economic Development)
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was set up in 1974 by the regional government of Emilia Romagna “to foster economic development and
upgrading in Emilia Romagna” (ERVET 1991). In an attempt to achieve this objective ERVET “provides
real services either supplied directly by the corporation or through ERVET System’s network” (ERVET
1991). Real Services have been defined by Bellini as a set of service activities that “generate structural
rather than temporary changes in the organisation of production within a company” (Bellini 1990, 173).
Hence, the collective service sector is directly involved in activities related to the circulation of information,
training, working out of plans, research activity and the circulation of innovation, each of which focuses
on three main areas, sectoral projects, horizontal projects and territorial projects (Cooke and Morgan
1991). Furthermore, ERVET seeks to operate with a public-private mix along with “credit and financial
institutions, entrepreneurial associations and Chambers of Commerce” (ERVET 1991), thus developing
networking practices. The structure and policy development of ERVET reflects the economic, social and
political structure of Emilia Romagna.
It is important to distinguish the role and function of ERVET from the typical regional enterprise agency.
ERVET, in particular, does not seek to encourage direct foreign investment or give direct grants; instead, it
provides real services for which firms pay a fee. The objective is that service centers such as ERVET provide
the kind of services that large firms frequently conduct in-house (such as R&D, promotion of new technology,
marketing) to the small firm sector. The advantage to firms that use ERVET is that they gain access to
business services at a price below that which they would have to pay if they used the private consultancy
sector. ERVET provides structural services that are consistent with its overriding aim of facilitating the
long-term economic development of firms and networks within the region. In short, ERVET enhances the
survival prospects of artisan firms by allowing small firms to compete on more even terms with large firms.
For example, ERVET promotes new technology activity by playing a coordinating role between small firms
in specific industries and interindustry agencies such as ASTER (Agency for Technological Development of
Emilia-Romagna). These alliances aim to ensure that the small firm sector has access to the latest computer
technology and does not suffer a cost disadvantage. This type of activity tends to be sector specific: for
example, CERAL (the Emilia-Romagna Centre for the shoe industry) provides technological information
so that firms in the shoe industry remain competitive in the market. At a broader level, the service center
provides a vast array of activities such as export promotion, access to European Community R&D programs
and projects aimed at environmental issues, such as industrial dereliction and pollution.
Additional service provisions are supplied by other service centers, again operating on two levels, the sector
and regional. At the sector level these centers cater to firms within their specific sector; at the regional level
they are concerned with issues such as technology transfer and export promotion. The economic rationale
can be seen to be arising out of market failure: “First of all, the initial investment required to put together
the kind of knowledge necessary to carry out this type of activity is quite high. The market itself is also
fairly small ... these kind of activities are specific to certain sub-sectors which include only a limited number
of firms ... the centres are not an invasion of the field occupied by private industry, but rather an initiative
to combat the insufficiency and incapacity of the market itself” (Brusco 1989, 417). Public financing of the
centers has a limited duration (a period of about five years). The idea is that the public authorities should
shoulder an important part of the initial investment, and then the centers should become self-financing.
Typical of the sector specific centers is CITER (Centro Informazione Tessile Emilia-Romagna) which operates
in the knitwear industry, centered in the province of Modena. CITER was established in 1980 by ERVET and
key players in the region, notably an amalgam of artisan associations plus two other industrial associations.
The idea of this particular sector specific service center arose out of a training project sponsored by ERVET.
The activities of CITER involved the development of a product called Citera, which is a computer aided
workstation for the design of knitwear. Citera was developed in conjunction with ENEA (the Italian
Commission for Nuclear and Alternative Energy Sources) and enables fashion designers to gain rapid recall
of thousands of images and colors. This enables the knitwear industry within the region to maintain a
competitive edge over low-cost imitators by speeding up the turnaround time from design to finished product.
What is being achieved for the SMEs in the region is external economies of scale through cooperation. The
cost of using this new technology would be out of the reach of the individual firm, but for a small fee firms
can utilize these facilities through the service center. The application of new technology to knitwear design
and fabrication constitutes a strategy that plays to the strengths of Italian fashion and stands in contrast to
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the approach adopted by much of the United Kingdom’s textile industry, which relies exclusively on cost
cutting. The use of such innovative techniques as Citera has drastically reduced the time taken from design
to production of a finished product from months to days, and Citera has helped in the development of the
concept of ready fashion.
CITER is but one example of the collective service centers developed in Emilia-Romagna. Similar centers
have been established in other industries including agricultural machinery, footwear, construction, ceramics,
metals and mechanical engineering (ERVET 1990).
See Figure 8.3 Marshallian industrial districts, according to dominant manufacturing industries, 1981.
Figure 8.3
The networking relationships developed within Emilia Romagna have led to the development of the phenomena
now known as new industrial districts. The thrust of the policy is based on information and real service
provision rather than grant aided assistance. Whether this concept can be applied to other regions is a
debatable point. If industrial renewal is to be attempted through an industrial policy with SMEs playing a
key role, the advantages of an industrial atmosphere should not be ignored. A networking approach promotes
cooperation in the input markets by allowing SMEs to make use of economies of scale and developing the
spirit of cooperation. Provision of real services has certainly been successful in encouraging growth and
has had an important effect in moving districts towards new technology and toward upper segments of the
market. But as Brusco (1988, 18) points out, “the problem which troubles many of us in Italy is whether these
internal policy measures which are taken at a local level, could be used in the South of Italy to transform
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clusters of firms into industrial districts.” Brusco’s view on this question is somewhat pessimistic: “there
has been realised in Emilia a harmonious mixture of discordant elements, but one whose complexity makes
it difficult to take as a model” (Brusco 1989, 183). While the exact experience of Emilia Romagna cannot
be reproduced, understanding where the gains from production within an industrial district actually arise
can assist policymakers as they attempt industrial renewal within geographically specific areas. Changing
the culture of an economy has been attempted in the case of Scotland, as previous sections have outlined.
Further evidence of the desire to change a way in which an establish economy operates is evidenced in “Our
Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge-Driven Economy,” the White Paper published in 1998 by the
Department of Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom. It is to a study of this strategy that we now turn.
8.3 Our Competitive Future
The White Paper on competitiveness was published on 16 December 1998 by Peter Mandelson, who was
then the trade and industry secretary. The aim of the White Paper is to reverse the long-term decline of the
United Kingdom’s economy. Along with the White Paper, the Department of Trade and Industry released a
paper that provides the economic analysis for the proposals found in the White Paper. The main focus of the
Analytical Report is the importance of knowledge and knowledge creation within modern industrial societies.
The Analytical Report informs us that while “knowledge has always been important, ...four mutually
reinforcing processes are increasing its importance for prosperity.” It goes on to identify the processes
as “Information and Communications Technology (ICT),” “increased speed of scientific and technological
advance,” “global competition,” and “changing demand” (Analytical Report, 3). The report cites the World
Bank’s 1998 World Development Report and OECD to reinforce the significance of the role of knowledge and
knowledge creation to modern industrial societies. The document is careful to differentiate between codified
and tacit knowledge. Codified knowledge is so defined if it can be written down and transferred easily to
others, tacit knowledge takes time to acquire and is difficult to transfer. Tacit knowledge has been identified
as a source of competitive advantage. Much of the White Paper is devoted to explaining how the roles of
institutions, organizations and individuals need to evolve to capture and develop knowledge, particularly
of a tacit kind, to create a competitive successful economy. In essence tacit knowledge can be accumulated
from within the firm, from its employees, for example, but it may have to be gathered through cooperation
with other firms and institutions such as educational and research establishments. This has led to a spatial
dimension to the analysis: “In some cases, the need for proximity to other firms or a pool of skilled and
complementary labour has led firms to cluster together in specific locations” (Analytical Report 1988, 4).
The organizations required to create and transfer knowledge are not necessarily new, and researchers and
practitioners within regional science will be familiar with many of the concepts found in the report. The
Analytical Report, underpinning the emphasis on networking and clusters found in the White Paper, highlights
findings from endogenous growth theory; namely the importance of intangible assets such as human capital,
R&D, brands, contacts and know-how (Analytical Report 1998, 17). However, due to the immobility of
factors such as labor and due to the tacit nature of many aspects of knowledge, there is a spatial aspect to
the establishment of a knowledge driven economy. It is through cooperation between the key players that
firms, regions and ultimately the United Kingdom’s economy is going to be competitive. In terms of science
and technology, for example, the Analytical Report explains: “To gain access to technology they (firms) must
network with suppliers, customers, competitors and other users of similar technologies. ...Firms are also
increasingly developing direct links with the academic science and engineering base” (7). The objective is to
then create governance structures similar to those that have been observed throughout this section, namely
partnerships, networks, clusters and spatially specific industrial districts.
The report argues that there are two processes at work that are leading to the necessity of greater collaboration.
First, while the importance of tacit knowledge has already been identified as the source of a firm’s competitive
edge, once it becomes codified it is more difficult to control than other assets of the firm. However, once it
does become codified it opens up the possibility for the firm to contract out. Second, due to the high sunk
costs of knowledge creation through R&D, it becomes more imperative to seek collaborators. The latter point
leads to advantages of both scale and scope (Analytical Report, 20).
Utilizing the established literature on clustering such as Porter (1988a and 1988b) and with reference to
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both Smith (1776) and Marshall (1890), the Analytical Report highlights the benefits in terms of economies
of scope “drawing upon companies with complementary skills to bid for large pieces of work which each of
the individual firms would have been unable to complete” (22). Similarly, clustering can result in savings
for individual firms by bulk purchases and joint marketing strategies. Further reference is made to external
economies which accrue to firms organized in a spatially specific cluster such as the establishment of specialist
support services. The utilization of knowledge, particularly tacit knowledge, is further enhanced with the
repeated interaction of firms that are close to each other.
The implications of the Analytical Report could have particular consequences for regional policy. Of the
seventy-five policy commitments in the report, the following are of specific interest to regional scientists:
• Funding for up to 10 proposals from industrial sectors to improve supply chains following a successful
program developed by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders
• Refocusing regional selective assistance grants on skills, providing £39 million for a skills survey and
£10 million for spending on competitiveness by RDAs
• Ministerial and regional encouragement for business clusters and networks, including a review of the
planning system
Clusters that are perceived to be of national significance will receive help coordinating across government and
with business. As a first step, a team led by Lord Sainsbury will promote industrial clusters in biotechnology.
The planning system will be examined jointly with the Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions (DETR) to make sure that it encourages enterprise and promotes the needs of industrial clusters.
To further encourage innovation, technology access and partnership between industry in the United Kingdom
and science and technology, further proposals in the White Paper include the following:
• Doubling Department of Trade and Industry funding for “technology champions” to support the transfer
of technology and knowledge between the science and engineering base and businesses
• Creating a network of partnerships to bring researchers together with businesses both large and small
to share ideas and commercialize research
• Awards to support high quality research partnerships between business and universities in technology
priority areas
• Measures to promote the commercialization of university research, including a new “Reach-Out” fund
to encourage universities to work more effectively with business; and a £25 million Science Enterprise
Challenge to create up to eight enterprise centers at universities in the United Kingdom
• A look at the working practices of public sector research establishments to ensure that they make the
most of the commercial potential of their research
This case study is important because it relates much of the theory that lies behind the vast literature on
governance structures to an attempt to implement policy. Within the United Kingdom, the White Paper
and the Analytical Report are also better understood in the political context of the New Labour government
and the so-called third way. In the White Paper’s foreword Tony Blair explains that “Old-fashioned state
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Glossary Terms
Clusters A grouping together of firms and institutions which can have vertical
and horizontal linkages. The geographical concentration of clusters
is not as important as it is with industrial districts, but clusters
are more concentrated than networks. Their emphasis is on the
development of cooperation among firms, with the objective of
achieving synergy
Constructive Cooperation The phrase “constructive cooperation” was first used by Marshall
in his description of industrial districts. The implication is that
economies beyond those expressed in internal or external economies
can be gained from cooperation between firms in the same industrial
district. Within Marshall this cooperation exists “without any
apparent drift to use it as a means of maintaining prices.”
DTI The UK government department responsible for trade and industrial
matters.
DETR The UK government department responsible for the environment,
transport and roads in England. Responsibility for these matters
has now been devolved to the Parliament in Scotland and the
Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland.
Evolutionary economics These are observed to have grown out of the institutionalist school.
There is an underlying vision of dynamics which is evolutionary,
in the biological sense, in character. The evolutionary concept
is a counter-position to that of static equilibria. The question of
incorporating evolutionary dynamics into economics was raised at
the beginning of institutionalism by Veblen and even earlier by
Marshall.
Governance Governance refers to the patterns and distribution of the institu-
tionalized capacity to take and influence decisions with regard to a
particular locality. Regional governance and regional institutions
came to the fore in the 1980s in economics and geography literature,
with attention given to dimensions of the long-term future and
development of particular regions and localities. Such dimensions
include the institutional capacity and thickness in an area, the
invisible factors in regional development, networking, and industrial
districts.
Industrial Districts Typically the Third Italy is dominated by production occurring
in industrial districts. The districts are geographically defined
productive systems, characterized by a large number of firms that are
involved at various stages, and in various ways, in the production of
a homogeneous product. A significant feature of industrial districts
is that a very high proportion of firms within them are small. A
characteristic of the industrial district is that it should be conceived
as a social and economic whole. In industrial districts, social
institutions are as important as economic.
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Institutional economics In institutional economics, final equilibria outcomes are said to be
dependent on the beliefs of agents and on the nature of institutions.
Institutional economics defines institutions as any shared rule or
sets of rules which guide individual behavior by supplementing the
conventional utility maximizing calculation. Institutional economics
reached its high point in the interwar period in the United States
when it became the principal school of economic thought. New
institutionalism, associated with the transaction costs school, is a
latter day development of many ideas of the original institutional
approach founded on a neoclassical view of economic behavior.
Industrial atmosphere Another term coined by Marshall to discuss knowledge transfer
within an industrial district. Marshall claimed that ideas, skills and
innovation get passed as though they exist “in the air.”
Learning Communities Industrialized economies are placing an increasing amount of impor-
tance on their knowledge base in order to maintain their competitive
edge. The development and maintenance of an economy’s knowledge
base requires learning. In a learning economy the rate of knowledge
turnover is high, learning and forgetting are intense, the diffusion of
knowledge is fast and a substantial part of total knowledge stock is
changed every year. Learning processes have been institutionalized
and feed-back loops for knowledge accumulation have been built in,
so that the economy as a whole is learning by interacting in relation
to both production and consumption.
Macro-level In the context of this text, the macro-level concerns the relationship
between regionally-based initiatives and the emerging system of
governance at the national, federal or European level.
Meso-level The meso-level concerns the role of development agencies and eco-
nomic actors in the political make-up of their region, and involves
the operation of individual agencies or networks of development
bodies within the region.
Micro-level Micro-level relationships involve the links between individual devel-
opment bodies, firms and other actors and their respective environ-
ments.
Networks Networks are the essential means of linking one group of agents
to others whom they affect. They are the intricate links based
on trust and reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange
between producers and clients that are necessary to ensure an
economic capability and responsiveness (Grabher, 1993) in support
of business development.
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Partnerships Beyond simple networks, partnerships require the commitment of
the agents to work fully together to address problems and oppor-
tunities. This means they must accept long term structures that
work toward sustained commitment to change and the achieve-
ment of quality. They must also accept an active commitment to
changing the internal operations of each agent and helping other
agents to change to achieve an improved system overall. Hence
networking alone is largely passive, whereas partnerships require
active participation (Mackintosh 1992).
QUANGOs Semi- or quasi- autonomous (non-)government agencies. Members
of the governing bodies tend to be appointed from a variety of
sources with the remit of overseeing devolved government spending
in many aspects of public life, health, economic development, and
public-private partnerships.
Regional development agencies An RDA is a semi-autonomous regionally based body operating
at arms length vis-à-vis its sponsoring political authority. It is a
multifunctional and integrated agency, the level of which may be
determined by the range of policy instruments it uses. It supports
mainly indigenous firms by means of ‘soft’ policy instruments.
SMEs Small and medium enterprises, usually defined in terms of number
of employees. Small enterprises are recognized as having fewer than
10, 20, 50, 200 or 500 workers; medium as having more than 10, 20,
etc. up to 500. Different agencies and authorities adopt different
thresholds according to the period and the policy questions and
instruments under consideration. Occasionally turnover is used to
define the size of enterprise.
Structural Funds The European Union funds assigned to address the structural prob-
lems of the regions and industries of the EU. They are allocated to
areas according to a number of agreed objectives, defined in terms
of unemployment, backwardness, declining industries, sparsity of
population, and similar factors.
Taylorist The US creed of scientific management, the application of work
study and a greater subdivision of labor as a means of achieving
increased efficiency (after F.W.Taylor).
Third Italy A term coined to differentiate production in north central and north-
eastern Italy which is of a different orientation than the developed
North and underdeveloped South.
Trust and Cooperation A crucial aspect of production within the industrial districts of the
Third Italy is attributed to the degree of trust and cooperation
which exists between the key players in the district. Economic gains
can be achieved by the promotion of trust and cooperation between
these key players, the firms, the financial institutions, the labor
organizations, and the local authorities.
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